Value implications of open source software : an empirical outlook to the open innovation model by Aksoy Yurdagul, Dilan
  
 
 
TESIS DOCTORAL 
 
Value Implications of Open Source Software: 
An Empirical Outlook to the Open Innovation Model 
  
 
 
 
Autor: 
Dilan Aksoy-Yurdagül 
 
 
Directores: 
Andrea Fosfuri 
Marco Giarratana 
 
 
 
 
DEPARTAMENTO DE ECONOMIA DE LA EMPRESA 
Universidad Carlos III de Madrid 
  
 
Getafe, Noviembre 2013 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
TESIS DOCTORAL 
 
Value Implications of Open Source Software: 
An Empirical Outlook to the Open Innovation Model 
 
 
 
Autor: Dilan Aksoy-Yurdagül 
 
Directores: Andrea Fosfuri, Marco Giarratana 
 
    
 
Firma del Tribunal Calificador: 
 
                                                                                                     Firma 
Presidente:  
 
 
Vocal:  
 
 
Secretario:  
 
 
Calificación:   
 
Getafe,        de                          de 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Universidad 
Carlos ID de Madrid 
www.uc3m.es 
  
Acknowledgements 
I am very grateful to my advisors, Andrea Fosfuri and Marco Giarratana, for 
having me guided through these years. It has been a privilege to have been their advisee 
and to have followed the path they have enlightened. I would like to give my deepest 
gratitude to two exemplar researchers, Sonali Shah and Francesco Rullani, to whom I 
look up to very much. I consider myself very lucky to have found the chance to work 
with them and to have been exposed to their work disciplines. I have learned a lot from 
them.  
I would also like to thank to the Business Administration Department at 
Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. I am thankful to the valuable faculty members, Neus 
Palomeras, Eduardo Melero, Jaime Ortega, Josep Tribó, Alicia Barroso, Pablo Ruiz-
Verdu, Samira Dias dos Reis, Fabrizio Cesaroni, Esther Roca Batllori, Ester Martínez-
Ros, Emre Ekinci and Pedro Serrano for their insightful comments and suggestions on 
my dissertation and for having aided with great help through all these years I have been 
pursuing my PhD degree. I would like to thank to the members of our secretariat office, 
Marié, Juan Antonio, Begoña and Raquel, for making things easier when everything 
seemed so complicated. I was mainly funded by the Department of Business 
Administration at Carlos III de Madrid, the Spanish Ministry of Science and Innovation 
and the Spanish Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness for my research. I gratefully 
acknowledge the financial support from these sources, which made my research 
possible. The Department of Economics and Business at Luiss Guido Carli University 
in Rome and Foster School of Business at University of Washington in Seattle have 
hosted me as a visiting researcher for short terms during my doctoral studies. I am 
grateful to these institutions for having me there and for giving me the opportunity to be 
surrounded by many valuable scholars. 
I warmly thank to my friends Juliana, Agata, Su-ping, Argyro, Gökhan and Aslı. 
I have endured many things thanks to them. I am particularly thankful to Zeynep and 
Inci for the sunny Madrid days we have wandered around together despite our very 
busy schedules. I am grateful to my very best friends, Mine and Duygu, for their 
positive energy at all times; to Merve, for her endless support across oceans; and to 
Magda, for being the best flat mate ever. 
 I would like to express how lucky I feel to have married to the most idealistic 
PhD student I have ever met. Emircan, thank you for being there when I needed the 
most and for giving me the energy and the will to accomplish my goals. I would not 
have made it through without your presence in my life.  
Words alone are not enough to express my gratitude to my family. I thank my 
father, Kazım, for having supported me in all my pursuits and for believing in me for 
whatever it is. I am thankful to my younger sister Helin, for giving me a reason to be a 
hard worker; to my older sister, Hazal, with whom we have achieved to be friends 
during though years of our lives; to my grandparents, Şengül and Ali Hikmet, for 
making me feel at home even when I thought of them; to my aunt, Filiz, for cheering me 
up when I needed.  
Special thanks go to my dearest Şebnem, my mother, who filled my heart with 
love, my soul with joy and my mind with endless dreams. I thank her for who I am and 
who I ever will be. It is all for you.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Abstract 
This thesis consists of three essays on open source software (OSS) phenomenon, 
which constitutes a suitable setting for investigating the open innovation paradigm and 
the benefits of firm-community collaborations for a firm.  
The first essay examines the impact of firms’ stocks of intellectual property right 
endowments on the relationship between firms’ OSS product portfolio and its firm 
value. The results suggest that firms taking more commercial actions in OSS paradigm 
enhance their firm value in the presence of large stocks of software patents. On the other 
hand, software trademark stocks have a negative effect on this relationship. Several 
potential explanations are proposed in the study, which emphasizes the importance of 
intellectual property right protection mechanisms for those firms that aim at building an 
OSS-based product portfolio. 
The second essay investigates the benefits that might accrue to a firm from their 
code contributions as reflected in stock market prices. The study builds on recent work 
in the area of community-based innovation and tries to explain why a firm might benefit 
from contributing to the commons. The hypotheses are tested on a novel data set that 
captures the stock market responses to 149 press releases made over a thirteen-year 
period. The findings suggest that open source code contributions generate positive, 
abnormal returns for the contributing firm. In addition, we find that contributions of 
new code rather than existing code generate greater value for the firm—and that 
contributions of new code to software projects targeted at end-users rather than 
developers systematically generate even greater returns.  
The third essay focuses on collaborations among firms and communities for 
obtaining better outcomes from open source projects. In specific, this study aims to 
disentangle how organizational design may affect the performance of an OSS project. 
Project’s management model and employee involvement in the project are treated as 
potential mediators that may have an effect on the aforementioned relationship. The 
empirical analysis is undertaken on a sample of OSS projects hosted on the platform 
SourceForge.net from December 2006 to December 2008. The findings of this study are 
three fold. First, being directly involved in a project with a specific policy on OSS has a 
positive effect on project’s performance. Second, coordination by firm has a negative 
effect on performance. Third, admin as an employee on main duty does not have a 
 direct positive effect on performance. However, it positively moderates the 
aforementioned relationship.  
The contributions of these essays to the existing literature can be articulated as 
follows: The first essay contributes to the current debate on commercialization of OSS, 
mainly, by establishing the intermediary effect of firms’ IPR holdings on the 
relationship between OSS commercialization and performance. IPR mechanisms in the 
form of software patents and software trademarks needed to be investigated as they are 
crucial firm resources in appropriating returns. This study sheds light on how much 
these mechanisms matter for performance consequences of commercializing OSS. 
Moreover, the study empirically shows how mismatching strategies may harm a firm’s 
performance while the firm attempts to move towards a new business model for better 
outcomes. 
The second essay contributes to the literature on community-based innovation 
by enhancing our understanding of the process by which firms can work within 
communities. Literature on open innovation encapsulates community-based innovation, 
as well as other mechanisms by which the firm searches its external environment for 
knowledge.  Other mechanisms—alliances, joint ventures, university collaborations—
have been the object of much empirical and theoretical attention in the strategy and 
technology management literatures. In contrast, community-based innovation has been 
the object of less scholarly work, but has attracted the attention of academics and 
practitioners alike, and firm engagement with communities appears to be on the rise. It 
also contributes to the literature on learning, where communities can provide valuable 
knowledge to firms, by providing systematic empirical documentation. 
The third essay contributes to knowledge on benefits of collaborations between 
firms and OSS communities. Firm’s role in the complex coordination mechanism of the 
project on project’s success has been investigated. Along this line, the paper can also 
directly inform managers on the strategies they should apply to assure long term 
sustainability of their external knowledge sourcing activities through communities. 
Managing the boundaries of collaborations is essential. Written rules and guidelines 
lead to fruitful joint development of software. 
 
 
  
Resumen 
Esta tesis está compuesta por tres ensayos sobre el fenómeno de software de 
código abierto (SCA), lo que constituye un marco adecuado para la investigación del 
paradigma de la innovación abierta y los beneficios de las colaboraciones entre 
empresas y comunidades para una empresa. 
El primer ensayo analiza el efecto de las reservas de derechos de propiedades 
intelectuales de una empresa sobre la relación entre el portafolio de productos SCA de 
empresas y el valor de la empresa. Los resultados sugieren que las empresas que han 
adoptado medidas comerciales en el paradigma de SCA aumentan su valor en la 
presencia de grandes cantidades de patentes de software. Por otra parte, la existencia de 
marcas de software tiene un efecto negativo en esta relación. Varias explicaciones se 
proponen en el estudio, que hace hincapié en la importancia de los mecanismos de 
protección de derechos de propiedad intelectual para las empresas que tienen como 
objetivo la construcción de una cartera de productos basado en  SCA. 
El segundo ensayo investiga los beneficios que una empresa podría obtener por 
sus contribuciones de código fuente como se refleja en los precios del mercado de 
valores. El estudio se centra en la línea de investigación de la innovación basada en la 
comunidad y trata de explicar cómo una empresa puede beneficiarse por contribuir al 
bien común. Las hipótesis se prueban con un dato nuevo que captura las reacciones del 
mercado de valores a 149 notas de prensa realizadas durante un período de trece años. 
Los resultados sugieren que las contribuciones de código abierto generan retornos 
anormales positivos para la empresa contribuyente. Además, descubrimos que las 
contribuciones de código nuevo respecto de aquellas de código existente generan mayor 
valor para la empresa. Y que las contribuciones de código nuevo a los proyectos de 
software dirigidos a los usuarios finales respecto de aquellos dirigidos a los 
desarrolladores, generan sistemáticamente aún mayores retornos. 
El tercer ensayo se centra en la colaboración entre empresas y comunidades para 
la obtención de mejores resultados de los proyectos de código abierto. En concreto, este 
estudio tiene como objetivo desentrañar cómo el diseño organizacional puede afectar al 
rendimiento de un proyecto de software libre. El modelo de gestión del proyecto y la 
participación de los empleados en el mismo son tratados como mediadores potenciales 
que pueden tener un efecto en la relación mencionada. El análisis empírico se realiza 
 sobre una muestra de proyectos de software libre alojados en la plataforma 
SourceForge.net de diciembre 2006 a diciembre de 2008. Los hallazgos de este estudio 
son los siguientes. En primer lugar, participar directamente en un proyecto con una 
política específica en SCA tiene un efecto positivo en el rendimiento del proyecto. En 
segundo lugar, la empresa como la autoridad principal de coordinación tiene un efecto 
negativo en el rendimiento del proyecto. En tercer lugar, si el administrador es el 
empleado de la empresa no tiene un efecto directo sobre el rendimiento del proyecto. 
Sin embargo, modera positivamente la relación entre la empresa coordinadora y el  
rendimiento del proyecto. 
Las contribuciones de estos ensayos a la literatura existente pueden articularse 
de la siguiente manera: El primer ensayo contribuye al debate actual sobre la 
comercialización de la SCA, sobre todo, estableciendo el efecto intermediario de 
derechos de propiedad intelectual sobre la relación entre la comercialización de 
software libre y el rendimiento. Los mecanismos de derechos de propiedad intelectual 
en forma de patentes de software y las marcas de software necesitan ser investigados, ya 
que son recursos cruciales de una empresa para poder capturar retornos. Este estudio 
arroja luz sobre cuánto estos mecanismos importan para el desempeño de 
comercialización de SCA. Por otra parte, el estudio muestra empíricamente cómo las 
estrategias incompatibles pueden dañar el rendimiento de la empresa, mientras la 
empresa pretende avanzar hacia un nuevo modelo de negocio para mejorar su 
rendimiento. 
El segundo ensayo contribuye a la literatura de la innovación basada en la 
comunidad mediante la mejora de nuestra comprensión sobre el proceso por el que las 
empresas pueden trabajar con comunidades. La literatura sobre la innovación abierta 
encapsula la innovación basada en la comunidad, tanto como otros mecanismos por los 
que la empresa busca conocimiento en su entorno externo. Otros mecanismos- alianzas, 
empresa conjunta, colaboración con universidades- han sido objeto de atención empírica 
y teórica en la literatura de estrategia y de la gestión tecnológica. Por el contrario, la 
innovación basada en la comunidad ha sido objeto de trabajo escolar menos a menudo, 
pero ha atraído la atención de académicos y profesionales también, y la colaboración de 
las empresas con las comunidades parece estar en aumento. También contribuimos a la 
literatura del aprendizaje, donde las comunidades pueden proporcionar valiosos 
conocimientos a las empresas, aportando documentación empírica sistemática. 
 El tercer ensayo contribuye al conocimiento sobre los beneficios de la 
colaboración entre las empresas y las comunidades de software libre. El papel de la 
empresa en el mecanismo complejo de la coordinación sobre el éxito del proyecto ha 
sido investigado. En esta línea, este trabajo también puede informar directamente a los 
administradores sobre las estrategias, que se deben aplicar, para asegurar la 
sostenibilidad de la adquisición de conocimiento desde los recursos externos a largo 
plazo, a través de las actividades de las comunidades. La gestión de los límites de la 
colaboración es esencial. Las normas y directrices escritas conducen al proceso 
beneficioso de creación conjunto de software. 
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CHAPTER 1 - Introduction 
1.1   Open Source Software 
 
Academic research has dedicated a great deal of effort to reveal and explain the 
sources of knowledge flows that lead to innovation. Although established theories 
suggested a closed innovation model, whereby a company generates, develops and 
commercializes its own ideas, a fundamentally different organizational model for 
innovation and product development referred to as open innovation (Chesbrough, 2003) 
has recently come to the fore. Open innovation model focuses on identifying, exploiting 
and integrating external knowledge into their internal R&D activities (West and 
Gallagher, 2006; Laursen and Salter, 2006). Firms adopt this new open innovation 
model that exploits the knowledge of various actors (e.g. customers, suppliers, 
competitors or universities) to sustain the ability to introduce new products to the 
market successfully (Chesbrough, 2003). Open source software (OSS), which is freely 
available to all that accept the licensing terms of the software, is the outcome of such an 
open innovation model whereby companies collaborate with communities of volunteer 
developers with intentions to co-create software. 
OSS has drawn attention from diverse academic fields throughout the last 
decade. This growing body of literature clearly emerged out of the great success 
achieved by well-known OSS projects such as Linux and Apache. The earliest studies 
centered mostly on motives that drove users and developers to contribute to OSS 
projects (Lakhani and Wolf, 2005; Lerner and Tirole, 2002), how innovation processes 
functioned (Lakhani and von Hippel, 2003), and governance issues in OSS communities 
(O’Mahony and Ferraro, 2007; Shah, 2006). As OSS became commercially viable 
(Fitzgerald, 2006), a new stream of research began to focus more on for-profit firms that 
collaborated with OSS communities (Bonaccorsi, Giannangeli and Rossi, 2006; 
Dahlander and Magnusson, 2005), the intellectual property right (IPR) mechanisms they 
used to ensure their returns from open business models (Henkel, 2006; Lerner and 
Tirole, 2005), and the competitive dynamics introduced by OSS (Bonaccorsi and Rossi, 
2003; West, 2003).  
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Henkel (2006) identifies four groups of benefits of OSS engagement for a firm: 
standard setting and compatibility, increased demand for complementary goods and 
services, external development support, and signals of technical excellence or good 
citizenship. Furthermore, OSS products can enhance the value created by proprietary 
software because they expand the firm’s product portfolio and help sustain its 
diversification. Specifically, they encourage quality improvements and innovation, 
threaten competitors, reduce costs, lead to dynamic capabilities, and ultimately can 
produce a competitive advantage (Bonaccorsi et al., 2006; Dahlander and Magnusson, 
2005; Schmidth and Schnitzer, 2003; West 2003).  
Despite the potential benefits articulated above, given the open nature of OSS 
that tends to make them public good (Lerner and Tirole, 2002), firms face the challenge 
of reaping these benefits out of it. Private-collective model of innovation enables us to 
understand why contributing to OSS communities may bring about private rewards for 
contributing parties that are not available to free-riders (von Hippel and von Krogh, 
2003). These private benefits, which exceed the costs of contributing, might accrue to 
the firm by enhancing the value of complementary assets (Dahlander and Wallin, 2006) 
or by increasing network externalities and nurturing knowledge flows (West, 2003).  
Appropriability regimes that use legal mechanisms of protection help firms advance 
their capabilities to retain created value in this specific setting due to the modular 
architecture of OSS code that can be combined with proprietary developments (Teece, 
1986, 1998).  
Although previous studies have identified potential benefits of OSS for engaging 
parties at large, the research stream lacks empirical evidence on the benefits of OSS 
engagement for a for-profit firm. To our knowledge, few studies have sought to unpack 
if and how firms actually benefit from contributing to innovation communities. Stam 
(2009) explores how firms that commercialize OSS products improve their innovative 
and financial performance through community participation. Alexy and George (2013) 
report systematic links between open and distributed models of innovation and firm 
value conditional on the legitimacy of firms doing so, as perceived by the capital market 
once the firm chooses its business model. Fosfuri, Giarratana and Luzzi (2008), on the 
other hand, emphasize the role of IPR mechanisms in firms’ decision to engage in OSS. 
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In this thesis, I aim to extend the recent line of research mentioned above by 
focusing on the effect of engaging in OSS communities and commercialization of OSS 
on firm performance. I attempt to shed some light on the open innovation paradigm by 
providing with empirical evidence on how, if any, firms may benefit from 
collaborations with communities within the context of OSS. 
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CHAPTER 2 - The Impact of Open Source Software 
Commercialization on Firm Value 
 
2.1 Introduction 
Open source software (OSS) has drawn attention from diverse academic fields 
following the great success achieved by well-known OSS projects such as Linux and 
Apache. Several studies centered mostly on motives that drove users and developers to 
contribute to OSS projects (Lerner and Tirole, 2002; Lakhani and Wolf, 2005), how 
innovation processes functioned (Lakhani and von Hippel, 2003), and governance 
issues in OSS communities (Shah, 2006; O’Mahony and Ferraro, 2007). As OSS 
became commercially viable (Fitzgerald, 2006), another line of research that focuses on 
for-profit firms collaborating with OSS communities (Dahlander and Magnusson, 2005; 
Bonaccorsi, Giannangeli and Rossi, 2006), the intellectual property right (IPR) 
protection mechanisms they used to ensure their returns from open business models 
(Lerner and Tirole, 2005; Henkel, 2006), and the competitive dynamics introduced by 
OSS (Bonaccorsi and Rossi, 2003; West, 2003) has emerged.  
Although the widespread adoption and acceptance of OSS has been attributed to 
its complementarity to proprietary developments (Bonaccorsi and Rossi, 2003; 
Schmidth and Schnitzer, 2003; West 2003) and its potential benefits for the engaging 
parties have been identified at large (Henkel, 2006), the benefits that OSS 
commercialization might bring about to a for-profit firm still lack empirical evidence. 
Investigation on commercializing OSS in relation to its profitability and the 
heterogeneity in firms’ assets in determining the level of profitability, if any, remains 
underexplored. To the best of my knowledge, there are only a few studies that try to link 
OSS commercialization and firm performance. Fosfuri, Giarratana and Luzzi (2008) 
focus on heterogeneity among firms’ endowments of protection mechanisms for IPR in 
explaining their decisions on incorporating OSS into commercial product portfolios. 
Their results suggest that variations in pre-existing stocks of protection mechanisms for 
IPR, namely patents and trademarks, help to explain why some firms are taking more 
commercial actions within the OSS paradigm than others. Stam (2009) explores how 
firms that commercialize OSS products improve their innovative and financial 
performance through community participation. Alexy and George (2013) report 
systematic links between open and distributed models of innovation and firm value 
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conditional on the legitimacy of firms doing so, as perceived by the capital market once 
the firm chooses its business model. 
In this paper, I aim to extend the recent line of research mentioned above by 
focusing on the effect of commercializing OSS on firm performance. Specifically, I 
assess the moderating role of IPR protection mechanisms on the relationship between 
firm value and OSS commercialization. In order to do so, I study a panel data for 70 
companies covering a seven year time span from 2003 to 2009. I argue that the potential 
for appropriating returns within the context of OSS commercialization depends 
critically on firms’ possession of software patents and software trademarks. The 
findings are twofold. First, I show that OSS commercialization cannot benefit a firm 
without the right set of IPR stocks. Second, software patent and software trademark 
stocks interact with OSS portfolio, such that while excessive number of software 
trademarks may affect negatively the relationship between firm value and OSS 
commercialization, software patent stocks have a positive effect on this relationship.  
In the next section, I present the theoretical background for the empirical 
analysis, before describing the data and identifying the variables in my estimations. In 
the empirical section, I present the results. Finally, I offer a brief discussion of the 
findings and conclude. 
2.2 The Role of Firms’ IPR Protection Mechanisms 
The literature on protecting the valuable knowledge is extensive (Rumelt, 1984; 
Barney, 1986). Closed innovation model suggests that a company generates, develops 
and commercializes its own ideas and it is managers’ key challenge to retain the 
knowledge within the firm in order to appropriate returns (Teece, 1986). On the other 
hand, open innovation, which has come to the fore rapidly as a new paradigm for 
corporate innovation, focuses on identifying, exploiting and integrating external 
knowledge into their internal R&D activities (West and Gallagher, 2006). Firms that 
adopt the open innovation model integrate these external sources (e.g., customers, 
suppliers, competitors, universities) into their internal innovation processes and 
competitive strategy to sustain the ability to introduce new products to the market 
successfully (Chesbrough, 2003). OSS, which is freely available to all that accept the 
licensing terms of the software, is the outcome of such an open innovation model 
whereby companies collaborate with communities of volunteer developers. Given the 
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open nature of OSS that tends to make them public good (Lerner and Tirole, 2002), 
firms face the challenge of reaping the benefits out of it. Appropriability regimes that 
use legal mechanisms of protection help firms advance their capabilities to retain 
created value in this specific setting due to the modular architecture of OSS code that 
can be combined with proprietary developments (Teece, 1986, 1998).  
How do firms’ endowments of IPR affect the relationship between 
commercialization of OSS and performance? To address this question, I first investigate 
the IPR protection mechanisms that might be crucial in appropriating value for a firm 
that commercializes OSS. Studies of OSS and associated appropriation regimes suggest 
several protection methods, ranging from licensing (Behlendorf, 1999; Hecker, 1999; 
Raymond, 1999) to standard protections such as copyright, secrecy, lead time, and 
complementary assets (Feller and Fitzgerald, 2002; Dahlander, 2005; Fosfuri et al., 
2008). 
I focus specifically on software patents and software trademarks, which are 
important firm resources that explain the heterogeneity in firms’ decision to engage in 
OSS commercialization (Fosfuri et al., 2008). Although copyrights provide an 
alternative IPR mechanism for software, my aim is to investigate whether or not firms’ 
efforts to build an open source-based strategy would bring the necessity to build 
strategic IPR portfolios as opposed to questioning the power of copyrights, software 
patents or trademarks in protecting the underlying technology per se. Building strategic 
patent/trademark portfolios dependent upon a firm’s short-term goals and long-term 
objectives is a debated issue in the domain of strategic management (Hall, 1992; 
Mendonça, Pereira and Godinho, 2004; Blind, Cremers and Mueller, 2009). Yet, within 
the context of OSS they have a critical role in defining the conditions in which its 
commercialization can be most beneficial. 
2.2.1 Software Patents 
As suggested by Hall and Ziedonis (2001), patents are important IPR 
mechanisms that a firm can possess not only because they operate as effective 
appropriation mechanisms but also because they confer negotiation power on 
technologies over external patent owners. Alexy and Reitzig (2013) argue that firms, 
which pursue private-collective model of innovation, continue acquiring patents mainly 
to gain de facto control over a technology among several proprietary competitors within 
 9 
 
the context of OSS. With a particular focus on appropriation mechanisms needed to 
profit from OSS commercialization, Mann (2006) argues that corporate members of 
OSS communities often continue to make heavy investments in software patents, 
primarily to protect themselves from the threat of litigation. The results suggest that 
without the intellectual property protection mechanisms, OSS cannot continue to grow 
in commercial importance.  
Fosfuri et al. (2008) argue why having a large portfolio of software patents 
might be good for OSS commercialization in three ways: potential complementarity 
between the patented software and commercial OSS products; control that they exert on 
future improvements of an OSS project; protection they provide with against litigation. 
Shah (2006), on the other hand, suggests that tight control of IPR also might discourage 
participation in OSS projects that rely mainly on volunteer programmers. According to 
this point of view, the concept of extracting financial benefits from jointly developed 
software contradicts the core values of OSS movement and thus, harms community 
members’ willingness to participate free of charge (Knyphausen-Aufseß and Schweizer, 
2011).  
In light of the previous related work, one may intuitively think that avoiding the 
extremes in building software patent portfolios when engaging in OSS communities for 
developing commercial OSS might be the optimal choice. However, it is important to 
make the distinction between creation of OSS and its commercialization packaged into 
proprietary products or services (Teece, 1998). Tight IPR might deter participation to an 
OSS project from volunteer developers. However, its benefit due to its use as an 
appropriation mechanism is essential. While implementation help by volunteer 
developers is important for the advancement of the project, firms that aim to develop a 
commercial product jointly with a community do so mainly in order to receive design 
help from their potential future customers (Goldman and Gabriel, 2005). Thus, firms are 
more concerned about attracting potential users, rather than programmers, to the 
communities that they collaborate with or they found with the aim of developing a 
commercial OSS product. Losing participation due to tight appropriability, thus, is not 
an issue for such communities whose principal contributors are future customers.  
In turn, I suggest that the positive effect of software patent endowments will 
dominate and a large software patent stock will operate as a complementary asset for 
firms commercializing OSS. Even if the software patents in such a portfolio may not 
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constitute a direct protection for what is being released per se, they may enable the firm 
to capture the value created through other channels. For instance, as noted by Lerner 
and Tirole (2002), by boosting profits on a complementary segment in proprietary form. 
A large portfolio of software patents will help firms expand their difficult-to-imitate 
complementary assets, which play key roles in firms’ sustained competitive advantage 
equation, for commercial OSS products leading to superior performance as measured by 
Tobin’s q. 
Hypothesis 1: Large software patent stocks positively affect the relationship 
between a firm’s open source software product portfolio and its firm value; 
such that as the number of software patents increases the relationship 
becomes stronger. 
2.2.2 Software Trademarks 
In contrast with the extensive debate on the value of patents in classical 
incentive theory (Hall and MacGarvie, 2010), trademarks have received attention only 
recently (Mendonça et al., 2004). A trademark refers to any word, symbol, or name used 
by a manufacturer to distinguish its goods from those sold by others. New trademarks 
provide important tools for positioning products in commercial settings. Mendonça et 
al. (2004) test whether trademarks might provide complementary indicators of 
innovation, which generally is represented instead by R&D expenditures and patents. 
They find a positive relationship between trademarking activity and product innovation. 
Trademarks serve for differentiation purposes, distinguishing the brand by leveraging its 
owner’s reputation. Registering trademarks is considered as an investment tailored to 
proprietary domain that aims at increasing consumers’ willingness to pay a premium for 
the quality of the product and the brand name (Fosfuri et al., 2008). OSS is a 
collaborative mode of software development that targets consumers, who seek cost-
saving solutions. Hence, firms with large numbers of OSS releases may cannibalize 
their existing lines of businesses in proprietary domains that are strongly associated 
with their trademark investments.  
Trademarks might as well be argued to improve the relationship between a 
firm’s OSS product portfolio and its value as they help firms build a strong brand name 
and reputation. Linux, Apache, and Debian all have trademarked their names, both for 
differentiation purposes and to prevent proprietary appropriations of their OSS code 
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(O’Mahony, 2003). However, the use of such a brand investment is to emphasize that 
the new product is superior to its existing substitutes with similar performances (Fosfuri 
et al., 2008). Consequently, I suggest that for firms with large repository of proprietary 
developments, commercializing OSS might entail the risk of eliminating their primary 
sources of competitive advantage, in other words, their proprietary software brand 
names that would lead to a loss of firms’ product-based competitive edge.  
As suggested by Alexy and George (2013), investors favor firms’ innovative 
activity when it is done legitimately. The authors stress the importance of category 
emergence and argue that once a category is chosen, the firm should act in a way that 
complies with its current innovation strategy to receive benefits. Building a large stock 
of software trademarks can be seen as part of a proprietary-based strategy. 
Commercializing open source software in such a case may send mixed signals to its 
customers and damage its overall position in the market place. Moreover, most of the 
commercial OSS products target home users, who are willing to pay more for ready-to-
use packages. On the other hand, OSS, at times, necessitates customization and is 
preferred by more skilled users (e.g. developers, corporate users). 
Thus, I suggest that building an OSS-based software portfolio when having 
registered for several software trademarks, in other words when having invested in 
proprietary domains, will have a negative effect on firm performance as measured by 
Tobin’s q. 
Hypothesis 2: Large software trademarks stocks negatively affect the 
relationship between a firm’s open source software product portfolio and its 
firm value; such that as the level of software trademark stocks increases the 
relationship becomes weaker. 
2.3 Data and Descriptive Statistics 
I undertake an empirical analysis with a novel data set in which I intend to 
include all companies operating in 10 software-related industries1 from the Fortune 
Global 500 list. Although the initial data contains information on 83 companies from 
                                                          
1 These industries are Internet Services & Retailing, Electronics & Electrical Equipment, Network & 
Other Communications Equipment, Computers & Office Equipment, Computer Software, Computer 
Peripherals, Telecommunications, Photo & Control Equipment, Information Technology Services, and 
Semiconductors. 
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1999 to 2009, I excluded those firms that lack financial information throughout the time 
span under study. Although I started collecting data from 1999, I ran the analysis using 
data starting from 2003. All the main explanatory variables are cumulative numbers, 
and four years of batching period should provide more reliable data. The final sample, 
which consists of 490 firm-year (70 firms  7 years) observations, enables me to 
explore the performance consequences of OSS commercialization under heterogeneous 
regimes of IPR protection.  
Table 1: Variable Definitions 
Variable Name Description Source 
TobinsQ (Dependent Variable) (Market Value + Preferred Stock + Debt) / Total 
Assets (Log transformed) 
Compustat 
OssPortfolio 
 
∑1999
t OSS products calculated for year t at a 15% 
discount rate (Log transformed) 
PROMT 
SoftwarePatents 
 
∑1999
t software patents calculated for year t at a 
15% discount rate (Log transformed) 
USPTO 
SoftwareTrademarks 
 
∑1999
t software trademarks calculated for year t at 
a 15% discount rate (Log transformed) 
USPTO 
FirmSize Employees in year t (Log transformed) Compustat 
FirmAge Age of the firm (Log transformed) Compustat 
 
From the Compustat database, I extract financial data, including market values, 
total assets, total debt, and preferred stock. I use Tobin’s q as the dependent variable, 
which offers a forward-looking proxy for firm value. When the value of Tobin’s q is 
greater than 1, the outlook for the firm’s growth opportunities is considered to be 
positive. Although this measure generally serves as a proxy to value intangible assets 
such as patents or trademarks, it also can reflect market hype or speculation, as is 
common in technology markets. As has been discussed by Lerner and Tirole (2002), 
releasing open source can be considered as a strategic move (e.g., to weaken a 
competitor). OSS commercialization and the use of complementary assets for revenue 
strategies should be differentiated as an effort for building a new business model that 
would bring benefits in the long term as opposed to releasing a proprietary software 
product with expectations of direct monetization for what is being released per se. 
Releasing source code signals technical excellence and goodwill (Henkel, 2006) that 
originates from firms’ intellectual capital, which can be captured by Tobin’s q. I 
calculate a modified version of Tobin’s q using the following formula (Chung and 
Pruitt, 1994): 
Approximate q = (MVE + PS + DEBT) / TA, 
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where MVE is the product of common shares outstanding and the month-end price that 
corresponds to the period end date; PS is the liquidating value of preferred stock; DEBT 
is the sum of total long-term debt and debt in current liabilities; and TA is the book 
value of total assets. The approximate q explains 96.6% of the variability of Tobin's 
original formulation (Lindenberg and Ross, 1981). Firm size, as measured by the 
number of employees, comes from Compustat.  
I next searched for press articles that reported a “product announcement,” “new 
software release,” or “software evaluation” in the software sector (standard industry 
classification code 7372) in the PROMT database. Reports of product introductions that 
included the phrases “open source” or “Linux” indicated possible OSS product 
introductions. I read the text of each article in the possible OSS product introductions 
set to distinguish articles that clearly referred to an OSS product introduction. Using the 
data from the product introduction announcements, I compute the cumulative number of 
OSS product announcements as a proxy for a firm’s OSS product portfolio. 
Specifically, I sum the number of OSS products introduced to the market starting from 
1999 at a 15% annual discount rate,2 such that I use the following formula: 
OssPortfoliot = (Osst + Osst-1(0.85) + Osst-2(0.85)
2 + … + Oss1999(0.85)
 t-1999),  
where Osst is the number of OSS introductions in year t. 
Table 2: Distribution of Explanatory Variables by Sector 
 All Firms OSS Commercializing Firms 
 No. 
of 
Firms 
Av. # 
Products 
Av. Sw 
Patents 
Av. Sw 
Trademarks 
No. 
of 
Firms 
Av. # 
OSS 
Products 
Av. Sw 
Patents 
Av. Sw 
Trademarks 
Internet Services  1 1.28 3.80 1.09 1 0.21 3.80 1.09 
Electronics 10 1.31 4.80 1.86 3 0.69 7.09 3.24 
Network 9 2.21 5.54 2.01 5 1.04 6.72 2.54 
Comp. & Office Eq. 12 3.22 6.71 2.42 8 2.15 6.63 2.61 
Computer Software 6 4.28 4.00 2.52 3 2.91 6.39 3.60 
Computer Peripherals 4 1.70 4.31 1.25 2 0.28 5.21 1.83 
Telecommunications 10 1.14 4.22 1.14 1 0.40 6.71 2.19 
Photo & Control Eq. 4 1.48 3.70 1.59 0 0 0 0 
I.T. Services  2 2.14 2.89 0.60 1 0.34 5.78 0.67 
Semiconductors 12 1.55 5.08 1.36 4 1.03 6.15 2.07 
Total No. of Firms 70    28    
 
                                                          
2 The Bureau of Industry Economics (BIE, 1994) adopts a discount rate of 15% when assessing private 
returns to patent holders because the value of patents tends to fall over time. I follow a similar logic for 
assessing private returns that OSS commericalization may bring about since the value associated with 
older products will diminish over time as technology evolves and enhanced products enter the market.  
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The information on patents and trademarks are from the U.S. Patent and 
Trademark Office (USPTO) database. I looked for all patents granted to a given firm 
each year (1999–2009). After gathering data about all patents, I identified software 
patents using Graham and Mowery’s (2003) algorithm, according to which certain 
international classification classes—such as “Electric Digital Data Processing” (G06F), 
“Recognition of Data; Presentation of Data; Record Carriers; Handling Record Carriers” 
(G06K), and “Electric Communication Technique” (H04L)—represent software 
patents.3 These classes are selected after examining the patents of six major U.S. 
software producers (1995 revenues; Microsoft, Adobe, Novell, Autodesk, Intuit, and 
Symantec) between 1984 and 1995. Patents in the three selected classes account for 
57% of the patents assigned to the 100 largest firms in the software industry (Hall and 
MacGarvie, 2010). Furthermore, trends in these classes represent overall software 
patenting activity, because they include areas in which patenting grew rapidly in the late 
twentieth century. 
Hall and MacGarvie (2010) compare three different classification methods to 
identify software patents with a sample of over 1000 manually identified software 
patents by John Allison (Allison and Lemley, 2000; Allison and Tiller, 2003). These 
three approaches to determine software patents are the ones that are used by Graham 
and Mowery (2003), by Bessen and Hunt (2007) and by Hall and MacGarvie (2010). 
Hall and MacGarvie (2010) also provide a new approach that combines those three 
approaches and suggest the superiority of the proposed combined method. Graham and 
Mowery (2003) approach does well on Type II error (detecting a patent as software 
patent when it is not), which is approximately 5%. However, it is not as successful in 
the case of Type I error (missing a software patent when it should have been identified), 
which is 40%. The proposed combined method by Hall and MacGarvie (2010) can 
achieve somewhat better at Type I error (27%) and does almost the same at Type II 
error (5%). Thus, I believe that applying the proposed combined method would not have 
changed my results since the software patents I have captured are representative for the 
actual software patent stocks a firm is endowed with. Identifying non-software patents 
as software patents is more problematic than missing some of the software patents that I 
should have identified. The other method by Bessen and Hunt (2007), although very 
good at identifying the software patents, identifies a large portion of non-software 
                                                          
3 The groups included are as follows: G06F 3,5,7,9,11,12,13,15; G06K 9,15; and H04L 9. 
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patents as software patents. Hence, I prefer to use Graham and Mowery’s (2003) 
approach over the other two. It is a more straightforward approach and will give robust 
results. 
Using the same source, I also extracted trademark data at the firm level on a 
yearly basis by searching for all trademarks filed by each firm between 1999 and 2009. 
To distinguish software trademarks, I applied the search algorithm suggested by 
(Fosfuri et al., 2008) and searched for strings of words4 in the text of the trademark 
description. The strings of words used to distinguish a software trademark are as 
follows: “computer software” or “operating system” or “computer program” or 
“software algorithm” or “data processing” or “software application”. The error 
percentages are 14.2 and 7.7 for non-software trademarks that were included as software 
(Type II) and software trademarks that were not detected by the search algorithm (Type 
I) respectively. I compute the cumulative number software patents and software 
trademarks at a 15% annual discount rate in the same way I computed OSS portfolio.  
Table 3: Descriptive Statistics 
 Obs Mean Std.Dev. Min Max 1 2 3 4 5 6 
1 TobinsQ 490 0.397 0.639 -1.434 2.371 1.000      
2 OssPortfolio 490 0.588 1.050 0 4.208 -0.168 1.000     
3 SoftwarePatents 490 5.442 2.249 0 9.456 -0.014  0.499 1.000    
4 SoftwareTrademarks 490 1.955 1.287 0 5.014 0.117  0.592 0.600  1.000   
5 FirmSize 490 10.145 1.392 6.446 12.895 -0.379  0.275 0.446  0.292 1.000  
6 FirmAge 490 3.639 0.818 1.098 5.069 -0.298 0.040 0.136 0.112 0.434 1.000 
 
Table 2 displays the distribution of average OSS product portfolio sizes, 
software patents, and software trademark stocks by industry. Out of the 70 firms in the 
sample, 28 introduced at least one OSS product to the market during the 7-year time 
span. The descriptive statistics and pairwise correlations for the main variables appear 
in Table 3. 
2.4 Empirical Analysis and Results 
After conducting a Hausman test, I run fixed effects model with Tobin’s q as the 
dependent variable to proxy for firm value. I incorporate interaction terms between 
                                                          
4 See Fosfuri et al. (2008) for more detail about the accuracy of the algorithm. 
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OssPortfolio and the two variables that correspond to firms’ IPR protection 
mechanisms, SoftwarePatents and SoftwareTrademarks. The full model is as follows: 
(1)  TobinsQit = β0 + β1 OssPortfolioit + β2 SoftwarePatentsit + 
β3SoftwareTrademarksit + β4FirmSizeit + β5FirmAgeit + 
β6OssPortfolioit*SoftwarePatentsit + β7OssPortfolioit*SoftwareTrademarksit + 
 + εit, 
where the subscripts i and t denote firm and year-specific observations, respectively. 
The dummy variable dy indicates year effects. Firm-level characteristics, such as size 
and age, are also included in the model. I used the natural logarithms of all the 
variables. 
The results from the first model with mean-centered interactions in Table 4 
reveal that although the coefficient for OssPortfolio*SoftwareTrademarks is 
significantly negative, that for OssPortfolio*SoftwarePatents is significantly positive. 
On the other hand, coefficients for the direct effects of OssPortfolio, 
SoftwareTrademarks or SoftwarePatents are not significant. Hence, the findings 
confirm both H1 and H2. Despite the rising trend in OSS commercialization by for-
profit firms, relying solely on an open business model remains too risky in competitive 
markets. Appropriability mechanisms, such as software patents and software 
trademarks, appear to be crucial for firms that are willing to commercialize OSS.  
I next estimate a second model to clarify the impact of firms’ IPR protection 
mechanisms on the relationship between OSS product portfolio and firm value. I split 
the data for firms that commercialize OSS into two, as LowOssPortfolio and 
HighOssPortfolio, depending on the number of OSS releases of firms. Then I create the 
mean-centered interaction terms with SoftwarePatents and SoftwareTrademarks 
variables as before. The second model is as follows: 
(2)  TobinsQit = β0 + β1 LowOssPortfolioit + β2 HighOssPortfolioit + β3 
SoftwarePatentsit + β4SoftwareTrademarksit + β5FirmSizeit + β6FirmAgeit + 
β7LowOssPortfolioit*SoftwarePatentsit + β8LowOssPortfolioit*SoftwareTrademarksit + 
β9HighOssPortfolioit*SoftwarePatentsit + β10HighOssPortfolioit*SoftwareTrademarksit 
+  + εit, 
where the coefficients β7–β10 measure the impacts of interactions between firms’ OSS 
portfolios at different levels and their IPR protection mechanisms.  
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The results of the second model indicate that the interaction term between the 
high levels of OSS portfolio and software patents (HighOssPortfolio*SoftwarePatents) 
is significantly positive, while that for the interaction between the low levels of OSS 
portfolio and software patents (LowOssPortfolio*SoftwarePatents) is insignificant. A 
similar result is observed for the interaction terms between low and high levels of OSS 
portfolios and software trademarks, suggesting that high levels of OSS portfolio are 
largely responsible for the findings. The inclusion of the interaction terms has improved 
the model’s explanatory power both in Model 1 and Model 2 as can be observed by 
looking at the adjusted R-squared values in Table 4. One may infer that while the 
marginal OSS released in interaction with software patents/software trademarks is 
associated with significant increase/decrease in Tobin’s q, the decision of whether to 
commercialize OSS or not does not seem to have a significant effect without the right 
set of IPR mechanisms. 
Specifically, firms taking more commercial actions while operating according to 
OSS paradigm can achieve a higher firm value when they possess complementary IPR 
protection mechanisms, such as software patents. While commercial OSS releases 
ensure diffusion and create a marketplace for complementary proprietary products and 
services, software patents help firm reap benefits. On the other hand, firms with large 
software trademark stocks experience decrements in firm value when they seek to serve 
their customers with OSS-based solutions. Open source solutions, which require skills 
for usage and maintenance, may not meet the needs of their established customers, who 
are willing to pay a premium for a ready-to-use package. Hence, OSS 
commercialization may cannibalize such firms’ existing proprietary lines of businesses 
that are highly linked to their brand investments. 
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Table 4: Fixed Effects Model 
Notes: Robust standard errors are in parentheses (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1). 
           Mean-centered values of the predictors have been used.  
 
 
 
 
   
VARIABLES Baseline Model 1 Baseline Model 2 
     
OssPortfolio 0.003 (0.115) -0.021 (0.122)   
     
LowOssPortfolio   -0.040 (0.147) -0.045 (0.160) 
     
HighOssPortfolio   0.003 (0.116) -0.024 (0.131) 
     
SoftwareTrademarks 0.027 (0.049) -0.012 (0.054) 0.025 (0.049) -0.008 (0.055) 
     
SoftwarePatents 0.034 (0.049) 0.067 (0.054) 0.034 (0.049) 0.061 (0.055) 
     
Oss*Sw_Trademarks   -0.151** (0.072)   
     
Oss*Sw_Patents  0.104** (0.046)   
     
Low_Oss*Sw_Trademarks    -0.197 (0.123) 
     
High_Oss*Sw_Trademarks    -0.141* (0.076) 
     
Low_Oss*Sw_Patents    0.118 (0.107) 
     
High_Oss*Sw_Patents    0.094* (0.049) 
     
FirmSize -0.125* (0.070) -0.132* (0.071) -0.123* (0.071) -0.131* (0.071) 
     
FirmAge -0.131 (0.226) -0.180 (0.222) -0.138 (0.224) -0.195 (0.221) 
     
Year dummies     
      _It_2003 0.358*** (0.074) 0.341*** (0.074) 0.353*** (0.075) 0.335*** (0.074) 
     
      _It_2004 0.330*** (0.066) 0.323*** (0.066) 0.326*** (0.067) 0.318*** (0.066) 
     
      _It_2005 0.347*** (0.059) 0.345*** (0.059) 0.343*** (0.060) 0.341*** (0.059) 
     
      _It_2006 0.325*** (0.052) 0.328*** (0.052) 0.322*** (0.052) 0.325*** (0.052) 
     
      _It_2007 0.261*** (0.048) 0.264*** (0.048) 0.259*** (0.048) 0.261*** (0.048) 
     
      _It_2008 -0.126** (0.053) -0.125** (0.052) -0.127** (0.053) -0.126** (0.052) 
     
Constant 1.931* (1.113) 2.173* (1.130) 1.710 (1.082) 2.226** (1.131) 
     
Observations 490 490 490 490 
Adj R-squared 0.840 0.842 0.839 0.841 
R-squared 0.402 0.413 0.402 0.413 
Number of firms 70 70 70 70 
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Graphical analysis offers a visual explanation of the interactive effect between 
IPR protection mechanisms and OSS releases. Three values of software trademark 
stocks, which correspond to the 25th, 50th and 75th percentiles respectively, were 
selected as representative of the range of software trademark stocks included in the 
sample. For OSS portfolio, on the other, the representative values correspond to 5th, 
25th, 50th, 75th and 95th percentiles.5 In Figure 1, there is one regression line for each of 
these software trademark portfolios. The smallest stocks of software trademarks 
(software trademarks = 25th percentile value) showed a very small decrease in Tobin’s q 
as OSS portfolio value increases from its value at 5th to 95th percentiles. At medium 
level software trademark stocks (software trademarks = 50th percentile value) showed a 
rather clearer decrease in Tobin’s q as OSS portfolio becomes larger. The largest stocks 
of software trademarks (software trademarks = 75th percentile value) showed a notable 
decrease in Tobin’s q with increasing values of OSS portfolio. Increases in software 
trademark stocks and OSS portfolio predicted a significant decrease in Tobin’s q. 
Furthermore, it is possible to observe that as the level of software trademark stocks 
increases the relationship becomes stronger. In Figure 2, each regression line can be 
interpreted as a representative for three different levels of software patent stocks that 
correspond to the values at 25th, 50th and 75th percentiles. The graph showed that 
increases in software patent stocks and OSS portfolio predicted a significant increase in 
Tobin’s q. Moreover, the statistically significant interaction suggests that this 
relationship is stronger for firms with larger software patent stocks. These results reflect 
the importance of aligning OSS commercialization with IPR protection mechanisms. 
These results imply that an optimal portfolio of IPR protection mechanisms for a firm, 
who aim to reap the largest benefits from a large portion of OSS portfolio, would be the 
one with large stocks of software patents and relatively small stocks of software 
trademarks. 
                                                          
5 In Figure 1 and Figure 2, the minimum value for OSS portfolio is below zero because the representative 
values were obtained based on the mean-centered values of the explanatory variables that I used to 
compute the interaction terms. 
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In order to alleviate the concerns that the results are being driven by the choice 
of Tobin’s q as a measure of performance, I re-run the analysis using gross profit 
margin as an alternative dependent variable.6 The results that I obtain from first and the 
second model using the alternative measure of performance remain unchanged in terms 
of directionality. However, there are some differences across coefficients on the direct 
and indirect effects in terms of significance. While, OSS portfolio, software trademarks 
and software patents seem to have a positive significant effect on performance measured 
through gross profit margin, the interaction terms created between OSS portfolio and 
software patents/trademarks are insignificant. As has been discussed earlier, the 
rationale for using Tobin’s q is due to its ability to capture future performance potential. 
Bharadwaj, Bharadwaj and Konsynski (1999) argue that they use Tobin’s q as a 
dependent variable in their study because IT investments contribute to long-run firm 
performance and to firm intangible value. In this study, I aim to investigate how firms 
reposition their IPR mechanisms with intentions to align better these assets with their 
business model. Since the focus of the study is on OSS commercialization, which can 
be seen as a long-term business model building activity of a firm, I believe using 
Tobin’s q as a forward-looking measure of performance is well-suited to the aims of 
this study. Moreover, Tobin’s q is risk-adjusted and less prone to manipulation 
compared to accounting measures of performance (Montgomery and Wernerfelt, 1988). 
 
                                                          
6 Gross profit margin, also known as profit margin, is a commonly used accounting measure of 
performance that can be calculated by the following simple formula: Gross profit/Net sales. 
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2.5 Discussion and Conclusion 
This study has two key findings. First, there is no direct positive effect of OSS 
portfolio on firm value. Thus, one can assert that the profitability of OSS 
commercialization is not as straightforward as that of proprietary software 
commercialization. In particular, appropriating returns from OSS commercialization 
cannot be achieved without complementary assets in proprietary segments since 
protecting the commons is the main challenge. Second, I assess the importance of firms’ 
IPR protection mechanisms, and specifically software patents and software trademarks. 
OSS is a special case, which challenges classical appropriation mechanisms due to its 
open nature. However, I observe indirect positive/negative effects of software 
patents/software trademarks on the relationship between OSS and firm value. 
Specifically, I find that large software patent stocks help firms perform better when they 
commercialize open source products. On the other hand, large software trademarks have 
a negative effect on the relationship between OSS product portfolio and firm value. 
These results confirm the importance of matching a firm’s appropriation mechanisms 
with its adopted business model. Software patenting works as a protection mechanism 
for complementary proprietary developments enabling firms appropriate returns from 
OSS. Software trademarks instead have a negative effect on the aforementioned 
relationship. Especially, firms with large stocks of trademarks may be at risk of 
jeopardizing their established proprietary developments as they introduce more OSS 
products to the market.  
The findings contribute to the current debate on commercialization of OSS, 
mainly, by establishing the intermediary effect of firms’ IPR holdings on the 
relationship between OSS commercialization and performance. Although there are 
studies that investigate the link between OSS and performance (Stam, 2009; Alexy and 
George, 2013), the moderating role of IPR mechanisms needed to be investigated as 
they are crucial firm resources in appropriating returns. Extending the work by Fosfuri 
et al. (2008), which emphasizes the role of these IPR mechanisms in firms’ decision to 
engage in OSS, this study sheds light on how much these mechanisms matter for 
performance consequences of doing OSS. Moreover, the study empirically shows how 
mismatching strategies may harm a firm’s performance while the firm attempts to move 
towards a new business model for better outcomes. 
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The transformation of OSS into a commercial strategy has obliged firms to 
reconsider their current business models. In doing so, managers must realize how much 
the fit of their IPR protection mechanism with their business model matters for value 
capture. Successful commercialization techniques combined with appropriate choices of 
intellectual property endowments can enable firms to capture the value created through 
open innovation models. Firms that aim to utilize advantageous attributes of OSS in 
order to create and appropriate value have to overcome the challenge of adjusting their 
respective resources in a way that is consistent with their current business model. 
Considering the findings of this study one might expect a firm, which commercializes 
OSS, to register for less software trademarks and to invest heavily in software patenting. 
My findings, which favor software patenting rather than trademark filing in an open 
source setting, further indicate that the adequacy of a firm’s appropriation mechanism 
for its business model determines how much value it can capture. In this case, OSS 
commercialization interestingly may harm firms if they make wrong choices in their 
appropriation mechanisms. 
Insufficient information about the development processes for the commercial 
OSS products and the licensing schemes under which they are released prevented me 
from undertaking a deeper analysis on the impact of OSS commercialization on firm 
value. It would have been helpful to know whether each product introduced to the 
market is a direct complement of a formerly introduced product of the same company 
(e.g., plug-in, extension). Another possibility would be examining the effect of 
copyright, as a potential isolating mechanism, on the relationship between new OSS 
product and firm performance. I believe the management model of the community and 
different firm participation strategies may also help us explain the success/failure of the 
outcome OSS product to be commercialized. The insights put forward in this study 
should encourage researchers, who are willing to investigate the profitability of OSS 
commercialization. I leave further investigation on potential explanatory variables, such 
as underlying licensing schemes, development processes or governing methods, which 
may explain the heterogeneities in returns generated by OSS commercialization, for 
future research. 
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Chapter 3 - Does it pay to be Open? Stock Market 
Responses to Contributions to the Commons 
 
3.1 Introduction 
“Of all the business reasons [for participating in open source software 
development]… design help may be the most important.  Many software 
products fail because they do not meet the needs of their intended users.”  
(Goldman and Gabriel, 2005, p. 80) 
Open source software projects such as Linux, Eclipse, and Mozilla have 
achieved remarkable success.  These projects provide participants with the social 
context and resources to create useful and publicly available software that has, on 
occasion, displaced commercially produced software.  The projects are distinctive from 
firms in that they allow others to access the knowledge they create rather than restricting 
access to key ideas and insights.  These open source software projects are exemplars of 
a fundamentally different organizational model for innovation and product 
development—referred to as collective invention (Allen, 1983), private-collective 
innovation (von Hippel and von Krogh, 2003), and community-based innovation 
(Franke and Shah, 2003).  This model extends well beyond the domain of software: 
innovative communities have been influential in fields as diverse as astronomy (Ferris, 
2002), automobiles (Franz 2005, Kline and Pinch, 1996), sports equipment (Franke and 
Shah, 2003; Shah 2005; Baldwin, Heinerth and von Hippel, 2007), personal computers 
(Freiberger and Swaine, 2000), and video games (Jeppesen and Molin, 2003).   
Innovation communities attract a variety of participants, ranging from hobbyists 
to firms.  A number of firms have begun to engage actively and deeply with open source 
communities.  For example, IBM currently employs hundreds of full-time employees to 
work within various open source development communities such as Linux and Apache; 
Netscape initially formed Mozilla project, which has then became very well known for 
producing Firefox web browser; Nokia and Oracle have contributed both software and 
developer time to the Eclipse Foundation.  These companies are recognized not just for 
building products based on open source software and hardware, but also for contributing 
to the commons.  This behavior is perplexing to a number of innovation scholars.  In 
this paper, we seek to investigate if firms benefit from contributing to the commons and 
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whether or not differences in what a firm contributes affects the value of the benefits 
that firms generate from their contributions.   
Several practitioners and scholars have suggested that participating in an 
innovation community allows firms to access unique knowledge and insights that would 
be difficult or impossible to access through other means, arguing that insights provided 
by a wide range of others who possess heterogeneous knowledge bases and use 
experiences can provide immense benefits to corporate product development efforts 
(Winston Smith and Shah, 2013; Goldman and Gabriel, 2005; Chatterji and Fabrizio, 
2012; Hargrave and Van de Ven, 2006).  If this is indeed the case, we should observe 
value being generated for firms when they work collaboratively within communities.  
However, communities—like university labs or firm R&D departments—are a 
particular type of innovation engine and function in particular ways.  Hence, engaging 
development assistance from the community-at-large may be more beneficial for some 
tasks than for others.  We build on existing empirical findings to develop theory, which 
suggests that firms might most effectively leverage knowledge and gain insights by 
working with user communities and we provide empirical support for our arguments.  
Specifically, we empirically examine the following three questions.  First, do firms 
benefit from contributing to innovation communities?  Second, does code that 
contributes to the creation of novel software generate greater returns than contributions 
of existing software?  And, third, do contributions of novel software to projects focused 
on building software for end-users, as opposed to developers, generate greater benefits?  
To address these questions, this paper examines stock market responses to press 
releases announcing contributions of open source software code by publicly–listed, U.S. 
firms.  Data from press releases are systematically coded and analyzed using an event 
study model (Austin, 1993).  This approach provides a tangible measure of innovation-
related benefits and has been used in the marketing and strategy literatures to estimate 
the value generated by a variety of innovation-related activities (Chaney, Devinney and 
Winer, 1991; Koku et al., 1997; Fosfuri and Giarratana, 2009; Sood and Tellis, 2009; 
Srinivasan, Pauwels, Silva-Risso and Hanssens, 2009).    
Three key findings are uncovered.  First, contributions to the commons provide 
tangible benefits to firms, as reflected in positive abnormal stock market returns to code 
contribution announcements.  Second, contributions of more novel code generate 
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greater positive abnormal stock market returns.  Third, contributions of novel code 
targeted towards end-users appear to drive the positive stock market response to firms’ 
contributions to the commons.   
3.2 Do Open Source Code Contributions Generate Value for 
Firms?  When? 
Firms have contributed millions of lines of source code to open source software 
communities.  For example, Sun Microsystems contributed over 9 million lines of Star 
Office software code (Sun Microsystems Inc., 2000), IBM contributed over half a 
million lines of relational database code to the Apache Software Foundation (IBM 
Corp., 2004), and Novell donated more than 200,000 lines of source code that formed 
the basis of Hula, a new community project (Novell Inc., 2005).  These and similar 
actions have triggered curiosity within the academic community and the realization that 
participation in innovation communities may provide firms with tangible benefits. 
The literature on firm-participation in community-based innovation is just 
emerging.  To date, this literature has focused largely on understanding how firms 
appropriate value from their contributions to innovation communities.  These studies 
suggest that value can indeed be appropriated, largely through the use of mechanisms 
outlined in Teece’s seminal (1986) work: complementary assets (Lerner and Tirole, 
2002), patents and trademarks (Fosfuri, Giarratana and Luzzi, 2008), and 
secrecy/selective revealing (Henkel, 2006).7  Benefitting from innovation, however, 
requires both generating value and appropriating value (Teece, 1986).  To our 
knowledge, few, if any, studies have sought to unpack if and how firms actually benefit 
from contributions to innovation communities.  As a result, key strategic questions 
remain: do firms benefit from contributions to user innovation communities? and, what 
                                                          
7 Although these findings are suggestive of the idea that firms might derive innovation-related benefits by 
working with communities to develop product features (innovations), empirical work examining value 
generation is needed.  For example, Fosfuri et al. (2008) document that firms with greater stocks of 
intellectual property are more likely to commercialize open source software, arguing that firms that 
commercialize OSS might then subsequently rely on their stocks of software patents to profit from these 
innovative developments.  However, it is also possible that firms with greater innovative ability are both 
more likely to engage in open source software development and have existing intellectual property stocks 
as a result of their proprietary innovative activities.  Similarly, Henkel (2006) documents that  firms are 
selective about what they reveal. However, it is not clear if the community subsequently play a role in 
further developing the information that the firm reveals—that is, in value generation. 
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types of contributions lead to the greatest benefits from firms?  We seek to investigate 
these questions.   
3.2.1 Insights from Innovative Users 
Innovation is a time consuming, difficult, and challenging task.  The success rate 
of corporate product development projects is low (Cooper and Kleinschmidt, 1995; 
Taylor, 2010).  Empirical findings from across the innovation management literature 
suggest that accessing and integrating knowledge from product users is one way in 
which firms can improve their chances of product development success (Griffin and 
Hauser, 1993).  The user innovation literature goes one step further, arguing that 
because the majority of potential customers do not necessarily recognize or have unmet 
product needs, market research that relies on information collected from the “average” 
potential customer will not necessarily uncover insights that lead to the development of 
revolutionary new products.  Instead, this literature suggests focusing on a small 
fraction of innovative individuals—user innovators—who do experience needs 
unfulfilled by existing products and services and create innovative prototypes that fulfill 
those needs (von Hippel, 1988).   
Knowledge of needs and features from the community of users is the key benefit 
that might accrue to a firm by contributing source code to the development of a public 
good.  Most important benefit suggested by two senior research scientists at Sun 
Microsystems—an early and prolific experimenter with open source systems—is design 
benefits (Goldman and Gabriel, 2005)  “Of all the business reasons given here, design 
help may be the most important.  Many software products fail because they do not meet 
the needs of their intended users...” (Goldman and Gabriel, 2005, p. 80).  Empirical 
studies find that the knowledge generated by innovative users is distinct from that 
generated by other sources of innovations and might provide firms with valuable 
innovative insights.  In the context of scientific instruments, user innovations tend to 
embody altogether new product functionality, whereas producer innovations tend to 
improve existing product functions along dimensions known to be important to 
customers (Riggs and von Hippel, 1994).  In the context of medical devices, firms 
engaging in corporate venture capital investment are more likely to incorporate 
innovative insights from user-founded startups than from employee- or academic-
founded startups (Winston Smith and Shah, 2013).  Learning from user communities 
support the product development process of a firm and make the growth trajectory of 
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this process visible to its investors.  Such collaborations will benefit a firm substantially 
by complementing its internal knowledge base with scientific, artistic, or technological 
knowledge (Hargrave and Van de Ven, 2006). 
Collaborations with communities that provide knowledge, which firms cannot 
develop internally, are essential for technology development.  Especially for small firms 
with limited resources, new product development may not be possible (Goldman and 
Gabriel, 2005, p.84-85). The knowledge and insights of a community of users and 
developers are critical resources especially for such firms.  These firms, by opening up 
their innovation processes, may gain access to several resources outside the boundaries 
of the firm.  Moreover, in community projects resource allocation is more efficient 
through self-assignment of tasks by community members since contributors know their 
skills and capabilities better than anyone else (Benkler, 2002).  Hierarchy and politics, 
which tend to create a tension in an in-house project, are less of an issue for community 
projects (Goldman and Gabriel, 2005, p. 181-182).   
In summary, engaging users may provide firms with several advantages that 
improve their ability to develop innovative new products and thereby generate value: 
innovative users provide insights into novel and needed functionality (problem 
identification),8 possess knowledge that firms may not have regarding problem 
solutions, and may increase word of mouth knowledge of the product. 
Hypothesis 1: Open source code contributions will generate value for firms. 
As described above, the insights of external users can benefit firms’ product 
development efforts.  Open source software communities attract individuals interested 
in using a particular piece of software: some individuals may find that the software, as it 
stands, fulfills their needs, while others will need to modify the software to fulfill their 
needs.  Individuals will therefore contribute to and modify a piece of software largely 
on an “as-needed” basis (Dahlander and Magnusson, 2005).  However, we argue that 
the value that a firm derives from the insights of open source participants varies based 
on the strategic reasons for contributing code.  For example, when code is contributed to 
gather insights regarding desired functionality, a firm might alter the features and 
functionality of a subsequent product offering such that the refined product is far 
                                                          
8 Thereby both ensuring/vetting the usefulness of a product and potentially increasing the range of what 
the product can be used for. 
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superior to the product that might have been released without insights from the open 
source community (Goldman and Gabriel, 2005, p.86-87).  When code is novel and has 
not yet been introduced on the commercial market, such insights are likely to be very 
valuable for firms as features have yet to be developed and refined.  Garnering insights 
from the open source community at early stages of the development phase can help 
prevent product failure in commercial market (Raymond, 2001).  This knowledge 
provides the firm with an advantage in the product market.   
Contributing updates to code that has already been released in proprietary or 
open source form may provide the firm with some benefits, in the form of 
standardization of the code which other participants are downloading, using, and 
modifying and/or feedback on new features released as part of the update.  As such, 
firms may gain some innovative insights through the contribution of updates.  However, 
the innovative benefits gained from such releases are likely to be less than the 
innovative benefits garnered from the release of altogether novel code.  Releasing novel 
code is more likely to result in a new product introduction, which will ensure a long-
term stream of cash compared to updates, and, thus, will bring larger positive abnormal 
returns (Chaney, Deviney and Winer, 1991).   
In contrast, firms also contribute code for a variety of reasons related to cost 
reduction, rather than innovation (Goldman and Gabriel, 2005; Bonaccorsi, Gianneli 
and Rossi, 2006; Dahlander and Magnusson, 2005).  For example, firms might 
contribute code for products that they no longer wish to support (Goldman and Gabriel, 
2005, p.90)9 or as a means of offering a discontinued product development project a 
second life outside the firm as a means of motivating (or not demotivating, as the case 
may be) valued employees who invested significant effort and time into the project 
(Goldman and Gabriel, 2005, p.85).  Such contributions signal the termination of a 
commercial product line or product development project, and hence reflect a decline in 
value for the firm.   
In summary, contributions of novel code—code that has not been released—are 
more likely to be made by firms seeking innovative insights, whereas contributions of 
                                                          
9 An example of this is Cisco System’s decision to open source their Cisco Enterprise Print System 
software (CEPS) so as not to have to maintain it in-house. Once the software is open sourced, even if the 
original developers leave the company their participation is ensured for a long time (Goldman and 
Gabriel, 2005). 
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existing code are more likely to be made by firms seeking to release themselves from 
development, support, or maintenance costs.  Hence, we expect that contributions of 
novel code will generate more value for firms.   
Hypothesis 2: Contributing novel code to open source software communities 
will generate greater value for firms than contributing updates or existing 
code. 
A particular piece of software may be targeted towards end users (e.g., 
applications or operating systems) or developers (e.g., development tools or 
programming languages).  We suggest that a firm may generate more value by 
contributing novel open source code intended for end-users than for developers, due to 
the viability of a commercial market for the code coexisting with the community.  
Commercial and community-based diffusion of products have been observed to occur in 
parallel in the sports equipment, probe microscopy, and segments of the software 
industries (Shah and Mody, 2013; Shah, 2005; Fosfuri et al., 2008).  For communities 
and commercial markets to coexist, two sets of individuals must be present: community 
participants engaged in building, modifying, and maintaining their own copies of the 
product and commercial (or “mass market”) buyers choosing to purchase standardized 
and tested versions of a product (Shah and Mody, 2013; Shah, 2005).   
In the case of development tools and programming languages, one would expect 
virtually all participants to access the code freely and openly through the community 
rather than purchase the code commercially, because individuals interested in using 
development tools and programming languages tend to be technology-savvy.  In 
contrast, end-users interested using applications or operating systems are a much more 
heterogeneous set with respect to their knowledge of software and how to use it: 
software users span the range from expert software developers to individuals struggling 
to simply use a software program.  As a result, we expect both types of participants to 
be present, thereby supporting both a community and a commercial market.  A firm will 
generate value from a novel code contribution by applying insights gained from 
community interaction to products sold in the commercial marketplace.     
Hypothesis 3: Open source contributions consisting of new code will generate 
greater value for firms when the code is intended for use by end-users rather 
than developers.  
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3.3 Data and Methodology 
Our goal is to determine whether or not firms derive value from engaging in 
open innovation activities.  In order to do so, we deploy an event study methodology.  
The abnormal stock market returns are a well-regarded means of assessing the value 
generated by innovation (Sood and Tellis, 2009).  Event studies gauge the cumulative 
value of an action to the firm by assessing abnormal returns triggered by press releases.  
Abnormal returns reflect investors’ expectation of the value of an action; because 
investors are the arbiters of the financial value of the firm and its activities (Aggarwal, 
Dai and Walden, 2006), abnormal returns provide a consensus estimate of the value of a 
particular action to a firm.   
Event studies are widely used in finance, accounting, marketing and 
management research (MacKinlay, 1997; McWilliams and Siegel, 1997; Kothari and 
Warner, 2004).  A number of studies have used event studies to assess the benefits that 
firms receive from engaging in innovation activities (Austin, 1993).  For example, event 
studies have been used to evaluate product development announcements (Sood and 
Tellis, 2009) and new product introductions (Chaney et al., 1991; Koku et al., 1997; 
Fosfuri and Giarratana, 2009; Srinivasan et al., 2009).  We use an event study 
methodology to estimate the abnormal returns to firms’ announcements of open source 
code contributions.   
3.3.1 Study Setting: Open Source Software Development 
Open source software provides a particularly useful context for examining our 
questions of interest for several reasons.  First, the event study methodology rests on the 
efficient markets hypothesis, which proposes that the stock price of a company fully 
reflects all publicly available information about a company: in the open source software 
context, not only do firms issue press announcements regarding their contributions to 
innovation communities, but their participation and contributions can be observed by 
those within the community and those outside the community.  Second, the context 
allows us to access the necessary data, as it is likely that most firm contributions to open 
source software communities are documented by press releases. This is because open 
source community contributions tend to occur in open and publicly accessible online 
forums, where it would be difficult for firms to attempt to hide their participation or 
delay announcements of their contributions.  Hence, a firm’s efforts to co-create with 
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the community are visible.10  Third, of all the settings in which community-based 
innovation has been documented and studied, the most research has been conducted in 
the context of the software industry.  This allows us rely on a variety of empirical 
studies to add insights and rigor to our theory building and improves our ability to 
interpret results.  Fourth, the software industry is generally free of regulation, meaning 
that individuals and firms interested in contributing to and using the software generated 
by community-based innovation development are able to do so.   
3.3.2 Sample 
The event is defined as an announcement to release source code to the public 
under an OSI-approved open source software license.11  Our study covers a thirteen-
year time span from January 1st, 1999 through December 31st, 2011.  We draw data 
from three main sources: Marketwire, PR Newswire and Business Wire.  These sources 
are the leading press wire services12 through which firms release information to the 
market (Solomon, 2012) and are widely used in event studies pertaining to business-
related issues (e.g. Alexy and George, 2013).  We accessed these data sources through 
the LexisNexis database. 
Because our focus is on gauging the impact of open source software 
development activities on firms’ innovation activities, we focus on press releases in 
which firms announce the decision to reveal software code.13  This allows us to restrict 
our analysis to situations where firms are actively engaged in developing innovative 
code in a community-based context.  We use a multi-step approach to identify relevant 
                                                          
10 In contrast, in other product domains, firms may pursue collaboration with communities in less 
transparent settings (e.g., by working with communities or particularly innovative community members in 
offline meetings, workshops, and conferences).  In such settings, a firm’s contributions to communities 
may be difficult to observe and a firm may choose to not announce their contributions publicly, making it 
difficult to access the data needed to conduct an empirical study.  The accessibility of data may be the 
reason why OSS is the most common setting for investigating community-based innovation. 
11 The Open Source Initiative (OSI) is a public benefit corporation and the community recognized body 
for reviewing and designating licenses as Open Source Definition (OSD) conformant.  See 
http://opensource.org/about. 
12 “Press wire services act as intermediaries between firms and the media. When a firm seeks to distribute 
a press release, it sends the release to a press wire service, which then redistributes the release to media 
partners. Most publicly traded firms in the United States rely on the two leading press wire services- PR 
Newswire and Business Wire (a subsidiary of Berkshire Hathaway).” (Solomon and Soltes, 2013) 
13 Firms also contribute to open source communities through sponsorship, marketing, coordinating and 
distributing activities.  Although these contributions might generate value for the firm, they do not reflect 
a firm’s engagement in innovation-related activities.  
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press releases.  First, all announcements that include the subject term14 “open source 
software” and the search terms (“releas*” or “reveal*” or “contribut*”) and (“open 
sourc*” or “source code”) in the body are retrieved.  Second, we identify 
announcements pertaining to firms listed on the NYSE, NASDAQ or AMEX.  More 
than 7000 announcements over a period of 10 years were identified in this way.  Third, 
we systematically assessed whether or not each announcement fit our event definition.  
We established a set of rules by which to identify instances when a firm released 
software code under an OSI-compliant license and applied this set of rules to each 
announcement.  Each announcement was coded twice to ensure that it fit the event 
definition.  This resulted in the identification of 231 events from 84 different firms.  
Fourth, it is necessary to exclude events that coincide with confounding events when 
conducting an event analysis (McWilliams and Siegel, 1997).  Confounding events 
include instances where a single company makes another announcement on the same 
day or one day before or after our focal event occurs.  This led us to exclude 76 events.   
As a final step, we dropped those 3 events with the highest abnormal returns and 
3 with the lowest abnormal returns in order to alleviate the concerns that the results may 
be influenced heavily on few observations.  Interpretation of significance in abnormal 
returns is problematic, especially for small samples (McWilliams and Siegel, 1997).  
Although our sample size may not be considered as small compared to other event 
studies with a similar empirical setting (e.g.  Oh, Gallivan and Kim, 2006; Alexy and 
George, 2013), we delete the outliers in our main regressions to avoid potential biases.  
These precautions reduce the sample size significantly.  However this is not a 
limitation: our sample size is well within the acceptable range for event studies.  The 
final sample consists of 149 events from 64 firms.   
3.3.3 Variables 
Dependent Variable 
                                                          
14 LexisNexis® subject and industry terms cover a wide range of topics including Banking & Finance; 
Medicine & Health; Computing & Information Technology; Law & Legal Systems; Trends & Events; 
and much more. Subject experts and information professionals create index terms and rules governing 
their application. These experts then iteratively test and analyze results before a term is released to 
production. Controlled vocabularies are applied to new documents as they are added to the 
system. Periodically, all indexed documents are retrospectively updated with the latest vocabularies. New 
terms are added regularly based on the need of a particular taxonomy and customer feedback. 
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We use cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) to measure the value generated by 
firms by engaging in community-based innovation developed.  Cumulative abnormal 
returns are the sum of the daily, irregular stock market returns abnormal in the days 
surrounding an event of interest.    CARs have been used to measure the value generated 
from innovative activities in a number of studies (Fosfuri and Giarratana, 2009; Sood 
and Tellis, 2009; Srinivasan et al., 2009).  They provide a particularly useful measure of 
innovation for researchers, because they are not subject to manipulation by 
environmental factors and they reflect how much investors value the new information 
(McWilliams and Siegel, 1997).  CARs are a well-regarded measure of the value 
generated by innovation (Sood and Tellis, 2009).  
Focal Variables 
Our focal variables are the characteristics of the code, which is made available to 
the general public.15  Specifically, we are interested in whether or not the code is new 
and the audience for which it is intended.  We use two alternative approaches to proxy 
for newness of the code.  The first approach involved creating three mutually exclusive, 
binary variables: New Code, Updated Code, and Existing Proprietary Code.  The New 
Code variable takes a value of 1 if the code is altogether new to the market (i.e., the 
code has not been diffused in the past, either as open source or proprietary source code).  
The Updated Code variable takes a value of 1 if the code is a new version (update) of 
existing open source or proprietary source code.  The Existing Proprietary Code 
variable takes a value of 1 if the code has been sold in proprietary form and is being 
released under an open source license for the first time.16 The alternative approach 
involves creating an ordinal variable, Novelty, which takes the value 0 if Existing 
Proprietary Code variable is equal to 1, 1 if Updated Code variable is equal to 1, and 2 
if New Code variable is equal to 1.  Figure 1 depicts how code novelty variable is 
constructed. 
 
                                                          
15 Each press release in the sample provides extensive information on the characteristics of the code 
contribution and the community to which it is being contributed.  Systematic common rules were devised 
to code each announcement in accordance with each variable definition.  In a very small number of 
instances, insufficient data was available through the press release; in such cases, additional research was 
conducted using firm and software community web pages to collect the needed information. 
16 Note that source code categorized as Existing Proprietary Code includes no new components/features, 
hence the market has had access to the functionality of the code in the past.  Cases where proprietary code 
was updated with new open source components/functionality are classified as Updated Code (5 such 
cases appear in the sample). 
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Figure 1: Categorization of Code Novelty 
 Licensing Model 
 Open Source Proprietary 
New code (n=40) New Code -- a 
Updates to existing code (n=27) Updated Code Updated Code 
Existing code (n=82) -- b Existing Proprietary Code 
a Code that was previously released as proprietary cannot be new by definition.  Hence this category 
represents a null set. 
b Existing code that was already released under an open source license would not be re-released.  Hence 
this category represents a null set. 
 
We also create codes to identify the target users of the code: developers or end 
users.  Code contributions pertaining to development tools are classified as being 
primarily for use by developers (Development Tools), whereas code contributions for 
system software or application software are classified as being intended for use by end 
users (System or Application SW).  There are 3 contributions that included code both for 
use by developers and by end users.  Development Tools and System or Application SW 
variables are not mutually exclusive since these 3 observations are classified in both 
categories in the sample. 
Controls  
We include four sets of control variables in the empirical analysis.  The first set 
controls for characteristics specific to an announcement.  Pre-announcement is a binary 
variable that identifies press releases that discuss code contributions to be made in the 
future (Koku et al., 1997).17  Pre-release is a binary variable that identifies 
announcements of alpha or beta releases of software that will be released in full form in 
the future.  We control for these two binary variables to avoid our results being driven 
by announcements that include forward-looking statements.   
The second set controls for firm specific characteristics.  We control for 
Software Patents, the total number of software patents that firm i has been granted with 
during the five years prior to time t, in order to account for firms’ endowments of 
                                                          
17 We classified announcements that described code to be released in the future as pre-announcements (all 
preannouncements specify the expected time frame in which code will be contributed; this time frame 
varies from 1 month to 6 months in our sample).  We classified announcements that provided a link to the 
released code or clearly stated that the code had already been released as actual code contributions.  
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intellectual property rights (IPRs).18  In addition, we control for OSS Announcement 
Ratio with which we aim to capture a firm’s interest and efforts of engaging in OSS 
movement (Hannan et al., 2007; Alexy and George, 2013).  We calculate OSS 
Announcement Ratio by dividing the number of press releases that include “open source 
software” in the subject term to the total number of press releases by firm i over the 1-
year prior to time t.  
The third set of controls includes five sector dummy variables to control for the 
industries in which firm i operates: hardware, software, electronics, semiconductors and 
telecommunications.  By doing so, we aim to control for firms’ technical expertise in 
developing software (Aggarwal et al., 2006).  We determine these industries using SIC 
code classifications (Fosfuri et al., 2008).19  Finally, we introduce year dummies to 
control for time-variant effects (Shiller, 2005; Alexy and George, 2013). 
3.3.4 Analytic Method 
The abnormal return to an event (announcement) is obtained in two steps.  First 
we estimate the normal return, which is the expected return that would have been 
observed if the event did not take place, for the time period preceding the event.  We 
follow standard practice by using the time period 160 to 5 days prior to the event 
(Campbell, Lo and MacKinlay, 1997).  Normal returns are estimated via Fama-French 
3-factor model (Fama and French, 1992)20. 
(Rit - Rft) = αi + β1i (Rmktt - Rft) + β2i SMBt + β3i HMLt + εit 
where Rit is the return on shares of firm i over the event window t, Rft is the risk-free 
rate of return at time t, Rmktt is the return on all firms in NYSE, AMEX and NASDAQ 
at time t, SMBt is the index of small versus big capitalization at time t and HMLt is the 
                                                          
18 We initially controlled for firm size in our analysis following other studies that also use an event study 
methodology to measure returns to innovation (e.g.  Aggarwal et al., 2006; Alexy and George, 2013).  
The intuition behind controlling for firm size in those studies is that since a large firm is likely to be 
engaged in various lines of business, an announcement might affect only a small portion of the firm’s 
overall value.  However, the Software Patents and Firm Size variables were highly correlated, thus, we 
dropped Firm Size from our list of controls.  The results remained unchanged. 
19 The SIC codes for hardware, software, electronics, semiconductors and telecommunication sectors are 
357, 737, 36 (except for 367 and 366), 367, and 366, respectively. 
20 Available at http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken french/Data_Library/f-f_factors.html 
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index of high versus low book/price ratio at time t.  Daily financial data are obtained 
from Bloomberg/Datastream terminal.21 
Next we compute the abnormal return (ARit) by taking the difference between 
the observed return on the day of the event and the normal return estimated via the 
benchmark model described above.  Thus, 
ARit = Rit – E [Rit] 
where ARit is the abnormal return, Rit, is the observed return and E [Rit] is the normal 
return for announcement i and event window t.  We compute the cumulative abnormal 
return (CAR) for each event by aggregating abnormal returns through the event window 
for each security.  We limit our event window t to 2 days that include the day of the 
event and the day before the event occurs.22  
We also investigate the effect of code characteristics on the magnitude of 
abnormal returns using a cross-sectional regression model:  
CARit = β0 + β1 New Codeit + β2 Updated Codeit + Β3 Software Patentsit + 
β4 OSS Announcement Ratioit + β5 Pre-releaseit + β6 Pre-announcementit + 
 + + εit. 
where CARit is the cumulative abnormal return across time t for security i.  New Code 
and Updated Code are binary variables that are used for identifying newness of the 
code.  We keep Existing Proprietary Code variable as the control group in this model.  
Software Patents and OSS Announcement Ratio are used as firm-specific controls.  Pre-
release and Pre-announcement are binary variables that account for forward-looking 
statements in the body of the announcement.  Dummy variables ds and dy indicate sector 
and year effects, respectively.   
3.4 Findings 
Table 1 provides descriptive statistics.  Correlation coefficients are presented in 
Table 2. In line with our expectations, the dependent variable (CAR) is positively 
correlated with contributions of new code, updated code, and system or application 
                                                          
21 Available on Bloomberg/Datastream terminal at Foster School of Business Library. 
22 It is expected that the significance of CARs diminishes as the event window enlarges (Campbell et al., 
1997), suggesting that the effect of the event is stronger around the day of the event. 
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software; and negatively correlated with contributions of existing proprietary code and 
development tools.  In line with existing empirical studies, pre-announcements and pre-
releases are inversely related to the dependent variable (Koku, 2009).23   
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics 
 Obs Mean Std.Dev. Min Max 
      
1 CAR 149 .788 3.075 -8.255 12.666 
2 Novelty 149 .718 .863 0 2 
3 New Code 149 .268 .445 0 (n=109) 1 (n=40) 
4 Updated Code  149 .181 .386 0 (n=122) 1 (n=27) 
5 Existing Proprietary Code  149 .550 .499 0 (n=67) 1 (n=82) 
6 System or Application SW  149 .483 .501 0 (n=77) 1 (n=72) 
7 Development Tools  149 .523 .501 0 (n=69) 1 (n=80) 
8 Software Patents 149 217.732 434.911 0 3027 
9 OSS Announcement Ratio 149 .066 .071 .003 .377 
10 Pre-announcement 149 .181 .386 0 (n=122) 1 (n=27) 
11 Pre-release 149 .094 .293 0 (n=135) 1 (n=14) 
      
 
Table 2: Correlation Matrix 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
            
1 CAR 1.000           
2 Novelty 0.129 1.000          
3 New Code 0.109 0.903 1.000         
4 Updated Code 0.037 0.154 -0.285 1.000        
5 Existing Proprietary Code -0.126 -0.924 -0.670 -0.520 1.000       
6 System or Application SW 0.046 0.036 0.020 0.033 -0.044 1.000      
7 Development Tools -0.012 -0.023 -0.015 -0.017 0.026 -0.960 1.000     
8 Software Patents 0.055 0.010 -0.097 0.244 -0.103 0.003 0.049 1.000    
9 Oss Announcement Ratio -0.042 0.083 0.081 -0.001 -0.072 0.094 -0.071 -0.092 1.000   
10 Pre-announcement -0.118 -0.069 -0.010 -0.131 0.110 0.033 -0.052 -0.035 -0.122 1.000  
11 Pre-release -0.006 -0.001 -0.039 0.087 -0.033 0.057 -0.024 0.025 0.150 -0.152 1.000 
            
 
Figure 2 and Figure 3 depict the distribution of events and distribution of firms 
contributing code across years respectively.  The trend in Figure 2 does not show a 
consistent decline or increase.  However, there are two declines in the number of 
announcements worth commenting upon.  The first begins in 2001, following the burst 
of dot-com bubble.  The second begins in 2007 and continues through 2008, in parallel 
                                                          
23 Koku (2009) find that announcements with less detailed information have a smaller positive effect on a 
firm’s stock market value than announcements with detailed information about the new product 
introduced: the latter send a more credible signal to the market by enabling investors to differentiate real 
contributions from “vaporware”.  “Vaporware” refers to non-existent products that a firm claims are 
“forthcoming” (Koku, 2009).  A similar pattern is expected for those announcements that include a link to 
the website through which the code contribution is available and that do not include such information. 
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with the start of the global financial crises.  Figure 3 depicts a more consistent and 
steady upward trend in the overall number of firms making open source code 
contributions each year.  A decrease in the number of firms does follow the burst of dot-
com bubble. 
Figure 2: Open Source Code Releases Across Years 
 
Figure 3: Number of Firms Releasing Open Source Code Across Years 
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Table 3 presents the results of the cross section regression analysis in which the 
dependent variable is the CARs over a 2-day event window and where errors are 
clustered by firm.24  The constant term in the first column (baseline model) reflects the 
CARs generated by code contribution events.  The coefficient on the constant term 
remains positive and significant at the 0.1 level.  In the second column we add two sets 
of control variables to account for announcement characteristics (pre-release and pre-
announcement) and firm characteristics (Software Patents and OSS Announcement 
Ratio).  The coefficient on the constant term remains large and significant.  These 
findings provide support for Hypothesis 1: on aggregate, investors’ react positively to 
source code contributions.  The results remain unchanged when we control for firm 
specific characteristics (Software Patents, OSS Announcement Ratio) or for the 
credibility of the announcement itself (Pre-announcement, Pre-release). 
Finally, we introduce our focal variables as well as the two sets of controls that 
account for sector and time effects (Table 3, Column 3).  In line with Hypothesis 2, 
which suggests that contributing novel code will generate greater value for firms than 
contributing updates or existing code, we observe that the coefficient on the New Code 
variable is significant at the 0.1 level and the coefficient on Updated Code variable is 
positive, but not significant.  The results are in the same direction when we use the 
ordinary variable, Novelty, as an alternative measure to proxy for the newness of the 
code (Table 3, Column 6).  The coefficient on Novelty is significant at the 0.1 level 
supporting Hypothesis 2. 
In order to test for Hypothesis 3, we split the data into two sub-samples and use 
the same model to estimate coefficients on the variables that proxy for the newness of 
the code (Table 3, Columns 4 and 5).  The first sub-sample includes those contributions 
that are intended for use by end-users and the second sub-sample includes those 
contributions that are intended for use by developers.  While the coefficient on the New 
Code variable is large and significant at the 0.05 level for the sub-sample of end-user 
related contributions, its significance disappears for the sub-sample of code 
contributions that are intended for developers.  It is possible to observe a similar trend 
when comparing the coefficient on Updated Code variable across two sub-samples.  
                                                          
24 We undertake a test of significance for assessing the adequacy of using CARs as dependent variable in 
our linear regression model.  We perform parametric t-test, which suggests that the average CAR value 
for the whole sample is statistically significantly different from zero at the 0.05 level. 
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While for the sub-sample of end-user related contributions it is positive, it becomes 
negative for the sub-sample of code contributions that are intended for developers.  The 
findings are in support of Hypothesis 3, which suggests that, when the contribution is 
intended for use by end-users, the newer the code the greater benefits it will bring about.  
The results remain unchanged when we use the Novelty variable instead (Table 3, 
Columns 7 and 8).  While the coefficient on the Novelty variable is large and significant 
at the 0.05 level in the column that represents the sub-sample of end-user related 
contributions, it is insignificant for the subsample of code contributions that are 
intended for developers.  Hypothesis 3 is supported in light of these findings. 
Table 3: Results of OLS Regression 
 Baseline Model Main Results 
   Full 
sample 
Sys/App 
SW 
Dev. 
Tools 
Full 
sample 
Sys/App 
SW 
Dev. 
Tools 
VARIABLES CAR CAR CAR CAR CAR CAR CAR CAR 
         
Novelty      0.617* 1.402** -0.049 
      (0.367) (0.607) (0.741) 
New Code   1.290* 2.932** 0.119    
   (0.763) (1.284) (1.493)    
Updated Code   0.259 0.434 -1.381    
   (0.787) (1.503) (1.109)    
Software Patents  0.000 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.001 
  (0.000) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) 
OSS Announcement 
Ratio 
 -2.721 -4.219 -4.339 -6.613 -4.089 -3.829 -5.887 
  (5.253) (4.060) (5.672) (4.874) (4.037) (5.962) (4.542) 
Pre-announcement  -1.253* -0.501 0.439 -0.919 -0.475 0.394 -0.630 
  (0.676) (0.720) (1.527) (1.189) (0.733) (1.584) (1.246) 
Pre-release  -0.251 0.576 0.858 0.324 0.556 0.613 0.398 
  (1.515) (1.931) (3.710) (1.025) (1.925) (3.650) (1.094) 
Sector Dummies   Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
         
Year Dummies   Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
         
Constant 0.696* 1.037** 2.495 2.861 2.091 2.523 3.089 1.992 
 (0.383) (0.506) (2.040) (2.685) (2.641) (2.024) (2.606) (2.620) 
         
Observations 149 149 149 72 80 149 72 80 
R-squared 0.000 0.020 0.132 0.234 0.284 0.130 0.227 0.270 
Robust standard errors in parentheses are clustered by firms 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
3.4.1 Robustness Checks 
Although we account for the informational heterogeneity of announcements by 
controlling for pre-announcements in our main regression analysis, we re-run the 
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analysis with a reduced sample in which we exclude pre-announcements.  By doing so, 
we eliminate the implicit assumption of homogeneous information (Koku et al., 1997) 
and assess the rewards to the announcements of official code contributions.  In such 
cases, open source code contributions are positively rewarded by the market with a 
0.97% increase in valuation at a significance level of 0.05.  Recalling that the CARs to 
the code contributions were about 0.66% for the full sample, it is possible to infer that 
investors react more favorably to actual source code contributions than to pre-
announcements of source code contributions that will be made in the future.  The result 
of a cross sectional regression analysis based on the reduced sample suggests that the 
findings remain unchanged (Appendix A).   
We also conduct a robustness check for Hypothesis 3 by introducing an 
interaction term between the categories that define newness of the code and a binary 
variable that identifies the intended audience of the code.  The coefficient on the 
interaction terms between New Code and System or Application Software variables is 
positive and significant suggesting that benefits are larger for firms that contribute new 
code intended for end-users.  These results are present in Appendix B. 
3.5 Discussion 
The core findings of this study are threefold.  By participating in innovation 
communities, firms can improve their innovation outcomes and thereby generate value.      
Soliciting feedback from communities pertaining to novel products or innovations will 
generate greater benefits.  And, finally, if these novel products or innovations are 
targeted towards end-users rather than developers, the benefits will be greater.  These 
findings support the theory that users generate distinctive knowledge and that this 
knowledge is a valuable input into firms’ product development efforts. 
This study contributes to the user and community-based innovation literature by 
joining a small number of papers in documenting the value of user innovation to 
established firms.  Product development is a herculean challenge (Cooper and 
Kleinschmidt, 1995; Prandelli, Sawhney and Verona, 2008).  Although it has been 
suggested that engaging users is likely to provide firms with an improved way of 
managing this challenge (Urban and von Hippel, 1988; Lilien, 2002; von Hippel and 
Katz, 2002; Jeppesen and Molin, 2003; Jeppesen and Frederiksen, 2006; Shah, 2006), 
few studies have been able to provide data to support this presumption.  In the medical 
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device industry, firms draw on the innovative insights of users when developing their 
own innovations (Winston Smith and Shah, 2013; Chatterji and Fabrizio, 2012), 
however whether or not these innovations generate value for the firm has not been 
examined.  Ours is the first study to provide systematic empirically documentation 
showing that engaging user communities leads to increased tangible, financial value for 
the firm.       
This study makes a further contribution to this literature by beginning to identify 
how user communities might contribute most to firm’s innovation efforts.25  We 
examine just two aspects here—novelty and audience—future research might examine 
other characteristics of innovations (e.g. incremental vs. radical innovation) or the 
characteristics of the marketplace for the innovation (e.g. high-tech).  A key goal for 
future work should be to continue to investigate “what activities is the firm best at and 
what activities are the communities best at?” Not all consumers help build a product, in 
fact, it appears that most do not.  Both community and firm can work together to create 
better products for the mass market. 
The findings add to our understanding on learning; where communities can 
provide valuable knowledge to firms.  Firms become actively involved in the 
community-based innovation model at a gradual level through various means 
(Dahlander and Wallin, 2006).  Active participation to communities, according to the 
private-collective model of innovation, will generate private benefits that will not be 
available to free-riders (von Hippel and von Krogh, 2003).  However, this assumption 
lacks empirical evidence within the context of community participation (Lerner and 
Tirole, 2002).  Learning from innovative community is an important way of gaining 
these private benefits, which will exclusively accrue to active contributors (Alexy and 
Reitzig, 2013).  We look at a particular means of active firm participation in 
communities, code contribution, with intentions to foster co-creation of software.  
Although our study does not constitute a direct test for the private-collective innovation 
                                                          
25 It is important to note that we look at the value generated by a particular set of interactions between 
firms and communities: the value triggered and developed when a firm contributes code to a community.  
Firms might also access user insights through other mechanisms.  Whether or not the mechanism by 
which insights are accessed influences the type (or quality) of insight is an empirical question, however 
the consistency of the current empirical literature on user innovation suggests that users possess unique 
insights that are difficult for firms to independently generate.      
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model, we add to the literature by showing empirically that for-profit firms are to 
benefit from contributing to the commons.  Our findings suggest that the contributions 
that generate the largest benefits are those that foster learning from communities by 
nurturing knowledge flows.   Investors reward those contributions that are novel and 
thus, are more likely to create a long-term knowledge flow between the community and 
the firm. Firms, in order to sustain their ability to introduce new products to the market 
successfully, can and should search for ideas from their external environments 
(Chesbrough, 2003).  And, communities represent a very robust alternative to firm-
based knowledge creation due to the virtue of collective creativity (Lee and Cole, 2003). 
Literature on open innovation encapsulates community-based innovation, as well 
as other mechanisms by which the firm searches its external environment for 
knowledge.  Other mechanisms—alliances, joint ventures, university collaborations—
have been the object of much empirical and theoretical attention in the strategy and 
technology management literatures.  In contrast, community-based innovation has been 
the object of less scholarly work, yet recent empirical work suggests that community-
based innovation may be a critical input to established firms’ innovation processes and a 
source of startups (Shah and Tripsas, 2007; Shah, Winston Smith and Reedy, 2012).  
Firm engagement with communities appears to be on the rise within the context of OSS 
movement (Bonaccorsi et al., 2006).  Gassmann, Enkel and Chesbrough (2009) suggest 
that open innovation approach within a community context seem to be beneficial for 
companies as well as users both practically and theoretically. 
We contribute to the literature on community-based innovation by enhancing our 
understanding of the process by which firms can work within communities.  We provide 
with empirical evidence on the benefits of co-creation of software in open source 
platforms for a firm with an established measure of perceived value of firms’ innovative 
activity by investors. However, an appropriate metric system for innovation is needed to 
compare and contrast the impact of open versus closed innovation approaches for 
assessing the right balance in a firm’s innovative agenda (Enkel and Lenz, 2009).   
Our findings illustrate that firms can participate in community-based innovation 
and obtain private benefits from doing so.  By engaging innovation communities, firms 
can nurture the co-creation of knowledge that can be fed into the development and 
design of commercial products.  We provide firms with both a rationale for why 
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community participation will benefit their innovation processes and guidance pertaining 
to how to derive particularly beneficial outcomes when sharing their knowledge with 
others in order to receive feedback.   
As with most empirical research endeavors, there are several limitations to be 
considered.  The general limitations that apply to all event studies are relevant to our 
study as well: the firms in our sample are publicly traded and therefore relatively large.  
As a result, the possibility of confounding events is higher.  In order to prevent biased 
results, we carefully identified and eliminated those observations that coincided with a 
confounding event and limited the event window to a maximum of two days.   
We examined a particular way in which firms can access ideas and feedback 
from innovation communities: code contributions.  There are other means by which 
firms might actively engage with communities and/or community members, such as 
conference or meeting participation, observation, consulting, hiring, or buying or 
investing in startups that emerge from the community.  Future research might 
investigate the viability of these mechanisms.  Our key contribution is in showing that 
community participation benefits firms. 
Finally, ours is a single industry study.  Future research might seek to replicate 
these findings in other industrial contexts. Doing so will require adapting the methods 
and approaches used, as one reason that open source software provides a viable context 
for studying firm involvement in communities is the transparency of the setting.   
3.6 Conclusion 
Tapping into users’ insights generate valuable innovative outcomes for firms.  
Benefits of engaging in user communities for established firms have long been 
discussed in management literature.  Few, if any, studies have empirically shown that 
those benefits are tangible as reflected in stock market prices and that they may vary 
depending on the characteristics of the innovation that is going to be co-created within 
the community.  We provide useful insights for firms interested in improving their 
product development processes.  Communities of users may provide firms with valuable 
knowledge and extend their understanding on product development on many fronts.  
Soliciting feedback for creating a novel innovation as opposed to soliciting feedback for 
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incremental developments generate greater benefits.  End-users as opposed to corporate 
users will provide with more insightful ideas for a novel product development. 
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3.8 Appendices 
 
Appendix A: Robustness Check - CARs for Announcements Pertaining to Available Code  
 Baseline Model Main Results 
   Full 
sample 
Sys/App 
SW 
Dev. 
Tools 
Full 
sample 
Sys/App 
SW 
Dev. 
Tools 
VARIABLES CAR CAR CAR CAR CAR CAR CAR CAR 
         
New Code   1.595* 3.798*** -0.244    
   (0.921) (1.196) (1.870)    
Updated Code   1.056 3.420* -1.672    
   (0.841) (1.976) (1.191)    
Novelty      0.817* 1.889*** -0.280 
      (0.431) (0.580) (0.874) 
Software Patents  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.001 
  (0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.001) 
OSS Announcement 
Ratio 
 -1.589 -1.271 -1.485 3.956 -1.503 -3.612 4.886 
  (5.287) (5.165) (8.702) (11.492) (5.112) (7.982) (11.666) 
Sector Dummies  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
         
Year Dummies  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
         
Constant 0.974** 2.508 2.027 4.045 1.430 2.028 4.096 1.361 
 (0.452) (2.361) (2.495) (3.136) (2.729) (2.476) (2.983) (2.783) 
         
Observations 107 107 107 49 60 107 49 60 
R-squared 0.000 0.174 0.204 0.474 0.365 0.204 0.461 0.350 
Robust standard errors in parentheses are clustered by firms 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Appendix B: OLS Regression Results with Interaction Terms  
 (1) (2)   (1) (2) 
VARIABLES CAR CAR   CAR CAR 
       
New Code 1.273* -0.770     
 (0.760) (1.123)     
New Code * System or Application SW  4.062**     
  (1.628)     
Updated Code 0.266 -0.347     
 (0.789) (1.151)     
Updated Code * System or Application SW  1.149     
  (2.027)     
Novelty     0.610* -0.374 
     (0.366) (0.571) 
Novelty * System or Application SW      1.964** 
      (0.803) 
System or Application SW 0.266 -0.975   0.279 -1.076 
 (0.603) (0.941)   (0.596) (0.857) 
Software Patents 0.001 0.001   0.001 0.001 
 (0.001) (0.001)   (0.001) (0.001) 
OSS Announcement Ratio -4.362 -5.435   -4.245 -5.224 
 (4.121) (3.639)   (4.093) (3.671) 
Pre-announcement -0.540 -0.124   -0.517 -0.161 
 (0.724) (0.806)   (0.734) (0.812) 
Pre-release 0.540 0.603   0.520 0.497 
 (1.906) (1.872)   (1.900) (1.849) 
Sector Dummies Yes Yes   Yes Yes 
       
Year Dummies Yes Yes   Yes Yes 
       
Constant 2.397 2.655   2.419 2.772 
 (2.072) (1.928)   (2.056) (1.855) 
       
Observations 149 149   149 149 
R-squared 0.133 0.174   0.131 0.171 
Robust standard errors in parentheses are clustered by firms 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Chapter 4 – Firm-Community Collaborations: Policy and 
Formality Effects on Performance 
 
4.1 Introduction 
Recently, innovation projects have “opened-up”. External linkages are now 
increasingly used by firms to tap on additional resources to develop their innovation and 
knowledge creation processes. Research has shown that the typology of external sources 
a firm can benefit from may be very heterogeneous (Laursen and Salter, 2006). 
Universities (Laursen and Salter, 2004) users (von Hippel, 1988) and suppliers 
(Jayarama, 2007) are only part of the possible subjects involved by firms in their 
innovation projects.  
A lively stream of research on this theme has recently shown that firms’ 
collaborate also with communities of users and developers (Jeppesen and Frederiksen, 
2006; Dahlander Frederiksen and Rullani, 2007; Sproull, Dutton and Kiesler, 2008), i.e. 
firms could innovate by engaging in community-based innovation projects (CIP). 
Collaborations with communities engender substantial benefits to firms by augmenting 
and complementing the scientific, artistic, or technological knowledge that they produce 
internally (Hargrave and Van de Ven, 2006). 
The literature on new product development (Trott, 1998) has shown that specific 
features of the projects and of the innovation to be produced (Brun, Saetre and Gjelsvik, 
2009), as well as the environmental factors (Akgün, Byrne, Lynn and Keskin, 2007), 
and the firm specific characteristics (Swink and Song, 2007) affect considerably the 
success of the project itself and its sustainability. Among these variables, a particularly 
relevant construct deals with the characteristics of the participants in the project. The 
relative heterogeneity (Giuri, Ploner, Rullani and Torrisi, 2010) or familiarity (Akgün, 
Byrne, Keskin and Lynn, 2005) of the involved actors, their communication channels 
and the way in which interaction is organized (Schulze and Hoegl, 2006) are qualities 
and processes that clearly determine –to various extent- the project’s capability to 
survive over time and the probability of a positive innovation outcome. 
At present, communities producing Open Source software (OSS) within OSS 
projects figure prominently among users and developers communities. The OSS 
movement has recently experienced a radical metamorphosis: it has acquired 
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commercially viable forms and has rapidly increased its economic importance 
(Fitzgerald, 2006; Dahlander, 2007). Software firms are getting increasingly involved in 
the OSS movement. Many firms, have adopted OSS-based business models (Dahlander 
and Magnusson, 2005; Gruber and Henkel, 2006) and have pursued to do business out 
of the OSS code that is freely downloadable from the Internet. Likewise, software 
firms’ participation in OSS projects26 is currently a widespread phenomenon. Firms 
participate in the projects of collective software development created by OSS 
communities through varied participation strategies. Firms sponsor and even coordinate 
OSS projects (O’Mahony and West, 2008), pay their employees to develop and debug 
open code (Hars and Ou, 2002), reveal their own proprietary software code to OSS 
developers (Henkel, 2009), and so on.  
There is important heterogeneity on how firms deal with OSS, since, when 
involved, some firms may have specific policies on OSS in order to establish the 
guidelines of collaboration. Projects, on the other hand, may vary largely by their 
governing models. While some are coordinated by a non-profit organization, some are 
coordinated by for-profit firms. In some cases there might be a formal leader in the 
project or the project as well may be coordinated informally. Several studies have 
explored the benefits from OSS projects’ participation (e.g. Henkel, 2009) in order to 
disentangle which incentives drive for-profit firms to engage in this form of collective 
action (see Capra, Francalanci, Merlo and Rossi-Lamastra, 2011 for a review). Another 
research stream has focused on the design of firms’ collaborations within OSS projects. 
In this respect, it has been noted that mutual adaptations are needed. Specifically, 
contrary to what one can expect for innovation projects originating and developed in a 
more “usual” firm-controlled environment, for fruitfully participating in OSS projects 
firms must properly design their business models (e.g. Bonaccorsi, Giannangeli and 
Rossi, 2006; Dahlander and Magnusson, 2005) and modify their internal organization 
(Colombo, Piva and Rossi-Lamastra, 2010; Dahlander and Wallin, 2006) to be able to 
accommodate the specific peculiarities of a subject (the community) that is placed out 
of their control. At the same time, firms need to support the capabilities of OSS project 
                                                          
26 An OSS project is defined as “any group of people developing software and providing their results to 
the public under an Open Source license” (Evers, 2000). OSS projects are generally made available online 
in so called development platform, which are also repositories for the code itself. These are dedicated web 
sites that provide a suitable environment for software development and interaction between programmers. 
The largest and most well-known repository is SourceForge (http://sourceforge net). At the beginning of 
January 2010, more than 380,000 OSS projects and 2 million users were registered at SourceForge. 
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communities to mobilize voluntary contributors (O’Mahony and Bechky, 2008; 
O’Mahony and West, 2008). In this line, a more recent research avenue investigates the 
impact of OSS projects’ participation on firms’ performance (Stam et al., 2009). 
However, the lively debate on the theme, research on firms’ involvement in OSS 
projects still leaves room for further investigations. Specifically, it is undoubtedly 
reasonable to expect that firm’s role in project’s coordination structure have diverse 
effects on projects’ performance. This paper aims to fill this literature gap by answering 
the following research questions: 1) How does direct firm involvement with a specific 
policy affect the performance of a community project? 2) How does coordination by 
firm affect the performance of a community project? 3) Does the involvement of admin 
in the firm have a moderating role on the relationship between coordination by firm and 
project's performance? 
The issue is of undoubted relevance. A crucial prerequisite for firms’ external 
knowledge sourcing activities from OSS communities is the existence of a long-lasting 
knowledge flow from these peculiar external sources. The tension between the members 
of the community and the professional firm in governing the project may lead to 
inefficient coordination that eventually may dry up this flow and even challenge the 
very survival of the OSS project. Being inspired by profit-seeking motives, firms’ role 
as the sole authority in governing the project run the risk of fatally undermine the core 
of OSS communities’ activity, which is often based on values at odds with the firms’ 
profit-oriented goals (O'Mahony and Bechky, 2008). 
The findings of this study are three fold. First, being directly involved in a 
community with a specific policy has a positive effect on project’s performance. 
Second, coordination by profit-oriented firm has a negative effect on performance. 
Third, admin as an employee on main duty does not have a direct positive effect on 
performance. However, it positively moderates the aforementioned relationship. The 
study contributes to our knowledge on benefits of collaborations between firms and 
communities. Firm’s role in the complex coordination mechanism of a community-
based project and its effect on project’s success is studied in an empirical setting. To our 
knowledge, there are no studies in the management literature that assesses the effect of 
firm policy, which describes how to work within the community, on the community-
based project’s performance.   
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In the next section, we present the theoretical background for our empirical 
analysis. Then, we describe the data and methodology. After presenting the results, we 
offer a brief discussion of our findings and conclude. 
4.2 Theoretical Background and Hypotheses 
Firms are making significant efforts to engage in collaborations with 
communities with expectations to receive benefits from these communities in return 
(von Hippel and von Krogh, 2003; Henkel, 2006). Without establishing a sound 
relationship that will lead to fruitful outcomes in a joint project, it may not be possible 
to reap the benefits that will accrue to a firm. For that end, it is important to explain the 
success/failure of these collaborative projects in order to give meaning to the benefits 
that they may provide to a firm. Although potential benefits of engaging in communities 
of practice for a firm has been identified at large (West, 2003; Dahlander and Wallin, 
2006), few, if any, articles have sought to explain the sources of heterogeneities in 
projects’ success that might have been originated from firm involvement in these 
projects. In specific, we aim to link firm’s role in the complex coordination mechanism 
of a project with the success of the project. Key drivers of sustaining a fruitful 
collaborative project are aimed to be investigated in depth.  
While firms’ efforts in allocating resources to a community project may seem 
most likely to enhance the outcome of a project, it brings together many potential 
conflicts. A critical error that a firm may commit when engaging in an OSS project is its 
failure in not clearly defining the role of core developers, who are assigned to work on 
the project (Goldman and Gabriel, 2005). In most OSS projects the members decide on 
what modules they are going to work on. For small scale OSS project, self-assignment 
of tasks by community members may turn out to be efficient since each of these 
participants would effectively allocate their own resources because they know their 
skills and experience better than anyone else (Benkler, 2002). However, for a joint 
project, which involves a firm, documenting the guidelines on how to develop the 
software within a community platform is very important. If there is firm involvement in 
the project, it is likely that the firm will market the project to attract as many volunteer 
developers as possible and assign its own full time employees to work on the project as 
well. Thus, firm involvement will enable both paid employees of the firm and volunteer 
developers from diverse technical backgrounds to work on the same project 
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simultaneously. The heterogeneity in members’ work disciplines may cause a “chaotic” 
style of development that would result in uncoordinated changes that interfere with one 
another’s written code (Mockus, Fielding and Herbsleb, 2000). In order to avoid such a 
problem in a joint project, which includes various groups of participants, the core 
developers must have a detailed knowledge on which modules and files they are going 
to work on and also on what other core developers are doing (Mockus, Fielding and 
Herbsleb, 2000). Assigning work activities among team members will increase a 
community-based project’s performance. 
Another common mistake of firms relates to the undefined metrics to be used in 
measuring the success of the OSS project (Goldman and Gabriel, 2005). Firms, which 
engage in community-based projects, most likely, also undertake some in-house 
software development projects at the same time. Failure in defining the metrics for the 
success can put a community-based project under strain and will give rise to neglecting 
community activities by the firm. Employees of a firm should be well-informed about 
the potential benefits the community-based project will bring about to their firm in order 
to understand the importance of the OSS project. Defining the metrics used to measure 
the success of the project will ensure employee dedication to the project by simply 
stating that the project is not less important than any other development project that is 
done in-house (Goldman and Gabriel, 2005, p.266).  
The biggest mistake, however, are those actions of a firm that treat a 
community-based project as if it were an internal proprietary project owned by the firm 
(Goldman and Gabriel, 2005). Those actions include neglecting the community 
participation and trying to schedule the entire development phase at an early stage 
instead of waiting for the community to grow organically or sneaking code from the 
joint-project to the codebase of an in-house project for instance (Goldman and Gabriel, 
2005). Such disrespectful activities that ignore the community will destroy the 
community’s trust in the company and discourage participation. 
We suggest that if a firm's involvement in the project is guided by a policy, 
which is formally defined and made visible to the community members, the firm will be 
able to avoid the aforementioned mistakes that are most likely to make during the 
development of a community-based project. Having a specific policy, which clearly 
defines the role of the paid developers, discusses how to handle the volunteer 
contributions, outlines the goals of the project, and clarifies how the project will 
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contribute to firm's business goals, will improve the performance of the community-
based project.  
Hypothesis 1: Direct involvement of profit-oriented firms with a specific policy 
will have a positive effect on OSS project’s success. 
Second hypothesis relates to the coordination style of the project. “A 
coordination style depends on a certain way how developers work on the source code, 
and more important, how they interact with each other” (Spaeth, 2005). Collaborations 
can be difficult when the interests, goals, and practices of participants differ (O'Mahony 
and Bechky, 2008). Extracting financial benefits from jointly developed software 
contradicts the core values of OSS movement (O'Mahony, 2003). Firm involvement in 
the project as the principal authority for coordination may create a tension between the 
community and the firm, which may deter volunteer participation. Moreover, 
endowments of intellectual property rights of the participating firm in the project may 
also discourage participation of volunteer programmers (Shah, 2006).  
Even if the interests align, it is hard to manage the boundaries of a collaboration 
that consists of a professional organization and participants of a social movement 
(Timmermans and Leiter, 2000). Firm’s hierarchical work discipline may not fit the 
free-will of the community members. Such a conflict will decrease efficient 
collaborative work among parties. Rucht (2004) suggests that in firm-community 
projects, firms tend to maintain their autonomy and in order to do so, they avoid 
becoming a single entity. It is hard to strike a balance between trust and control in the 
presence of firm involvement within a community-based project and failing to do so 
may deter participation from volunteers. Thus, we suggest that coordination by profit-
oriented firm will have a negative effect on project’s performance. 
Hypothesis 2: Coordination by profit-oriented firms will have a negative effect 
on projects' performance. 
Drawing on social network theory it is argued that there are favorable network 
positions that enable firms to manage key resources without ownership in the legal 
sense (Burt, 1992; Wasserman and Faust, 1994). Dahlander and Wallin (2006) suggest 
that firms act strategically by claiming these favorable network positions in an OSS 
community to be able to gain access to privileged information. Key person in a 
professional network may act as technological broker by combining the best of both 
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worlds (Hargadon and Sutton, 1997) and build legitimacy, which can be achieved 
through proof of skillfulness and by providing help to other individuals in the 
community. Having a full time employee, whose main duty is to work on the project 
together with other participants, will help the community develop more organically 
instead of pushing a strong corporate agenda that will seem suspicious to the 
community.  
We suggest that by assigning the administrator position to an employee as 
his/her main duty, a firm will have favorable position within the project. And, thus, 
negative effect of coordination by firm on performance will decrease. The admin of the 
project, who at the same time is an employee of the firm, will have advantage in terms 
of financial resources and will have access to the results and developments from in-
house investments. A firm employee fully dedicated to work on the project as the admin 
may offset the tension between the community and the firm by building legitimacy and, 
thus, will positively moderate the relationship between coordination by firm and 
project’s performance. 
Hypothesis 3: If the administrator of the project is a full-time employee of the 
firm, whose main duty is to work on the project, the negative effect of 
coordination by profit-oriented firm will decrease. 
4.3 Research Method 
4.3.1 Sample and Data Collection 
Our empirical analysis is undertaken on a sample of Java-based27 OSS projects 
hosted on the platform SourceForge.net28, which is the largest and most popular 
repository of community based OSS developments. Multiple sources of data have been 
used to gather information that enables us for grounded theory development and 
validation of theoretical constructs. 
An online survey was run in late November 2007 to collect data on projects’ 
coordination styles and firms’ various involvement modes within these OSS projects 
(Capra, Francalanci, Merlo and Rossi-Lamastra, 2011). Specifically, the online survey 
was addressed to all the administrators of the 8,308 OSS projects written in Java and 
                                                          
27 Java programming language is one of the most popular programming languages. 
28 cf. http://www.sourceforge.net 
 65 
 
hosted on SourceForge.net as of November 2007 (see Capra et al., 2011 for further 
details). The survey includes questions that aim at identifying project characteristics, 
which are not possible to retrieve from the internet and also questions regarding the 
leading company, when there is firm involvement in the project. The questions related 
to firm involvement were more specifically about the role of the firm (e.g. sponsor, 
founder, directly involved with or without specific policy, simply acknowledges 
participation of its employees), the relation of the administrator of the project with the 
firm, and the management method of the project. We also gathered secondary data on 
each firm identified in this way using Internet searches and calling up directly the firms 
when needed. 
The questionnaire was hosted on SurveyMonkey.com, a website specialized in 
online surveys. Each project’s administrator was contacted via e-mail by sending 
him/her the URL of the questionnaire and a reference institutional home-page. In case 
of ambiguous or incoherent answers, she or he was re-contacted via e-mail and 
interviewed to clarify the goals of the questionnaire and obtain correct data. These 
interviews were also used to check whether the project information declared on 
SourceForge.net was correct. Before submitting the questionnaire to the selected 
administrators, a pilot test on a random sample of 195 administrators, stratified by 
project size, was run. This pilot test was carried out with several OSS developers and 
project administrators, who extensively discussed a preliminary version of the 
questionnaire. The final version accounts for the feedback and comments by the 
participants of this pilot stage. The survey was conducted starting from November, 27th 
2007. After the first mailing, two follow-ups were performed, starting from December, 
5th 2007 and December, 18th 2007, respectively. The answers obtained were relative to 
1408 OSS projects. 
We have then matched these data to those retrieved directly from the platform 
and collected by Notre Dame University (see Madey, 2009). Initially, we dropped 97 
projects that were initiated after the first questionnaire in December 2006. Then, we 
dropped 212 observations, which either lack the necessary information related to the 
firm (e.g. size, age, and sector) or have missing items from the questionnaire29. The 
                                                          
29 In order to alleviate the concerns that the results might have been affected from a non-response bias, we 
run Wilcoxon Mann-Whitney test to compare our variables of interests across sub-samples (sub-sample of 
observations before and after dropping the observations with missing items). Mean values of both of the 
dependent variables, File_Size_t3 and File_Number_t3, seems statistically significantly different from 
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combined dataset includes information on 1099 OSS projects out of which 267 of them 
are being developed in collaboration with a firm. This final sample allows us to analyze 
the direct effects of firm involvement with specific policy and the coordination by firm 
as well as the indirect effect of admin’s role in the firm as the employee on main duty 
through interaction with coordination by firm. 
We have both projects with and without firms, and this allows us to isolate the 
effect of the firm presence, provided that we can control for the projects’ characteristics 
both as such, and as a source of firms’ selection of projects. To account for these 
problems and to decrease endogeneity, we thus decided to structure our equations as 
follows:  
1) To assure exogeneity in the regression, we have created three time periods: t1 
spanning the months from August to December 2006, t2 from August to December 
2007, and t3 from August to December 2008. Stock variables (such as the number of 
team members) are measured at the end of each period, while flow variables are 
measured over each whole period. 
2) Our dependent variables are measured in period t3, while our main variables 
of interest, i.e. policy, coordination styles, are relative to period t2. We also included the 
main projects characteristics relative to period in t2 in order to account for possible 
biases induced by the projects’ intrinsic capabilities.  
3) To rule out the selection bias described above we also included projects’ 
characteristics in period t1, so that we should obtain results net of the initial 
attractiveness projects had for firms and of the degree at which projects may have been 
open to firms’ presence. 
4.3.2 Measures and Validation 
We aim to capture the performance of a project on the basis of its productivity. 
In specific, we use the sum of the total sizes of files (File_Size_t3) and the number of 
files generated for each project (File_Number_t3). These measures enable us to have an 
idea about the volume of the code developed in the project.  
Three sets of items are used to proxy for our variables of interest in order to test 
the hypotheses put forward (see Appendix A). First set of items relate to firm’s 
                                                                                                                                                                          
each other for the two sub-samples. We also compare our main variables of interests across two sub-
samples. The results remain unchanged meaning that our results are not caused due to a non-response 
bias. 
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direct/indirect involvement in the project and the presence of a policy on OSS. In order 
to test for Hypothesis 1, we create a binary variable, 
Direct_Involvement_with_Policy_t2, which takes the value 1; if the firm is directly 
involved in the project with a specific policy and 0; otherwise. Hypothesis 2 relates to 
the management model of the company and it postulates that coordination by profit-
oriented firm will a have negative effect on project’s performance. We create a binary 
variable, Coordination_by_Firm_t2, which takes the value 1; if the firm is the main 
authority for projects’ coordination activities and 0; otherwise. Finally, in order to test 
for Hypothesis 3, we create a binary variable, Admin/Employee&Main_Duty_t2, which 
takes the value ;1 if the admin of the project is an employee of the firm, whose main 
duty is to work on the project and 0; otherwise.  
We control for the remaining categories of the three items from which we 
created our variables of interest explained above. When testing Hypothesis 1, we control 
for the binary variables that represent the categories of direct involvement with no 
specific policy on the project (Direct_Involvement_No_Policy_t2) and no direct 
involvement in the project (No_Direct_Involvement_t2). The latter is the omitted 
category in the regression analysis. When testing Hypothesis 2, we control for the 
categories of coordination by formal leadership (Coordination_Formal_Leadership_t2), 
coordination by key people through experience (Coordination_Key_People_t2), 
informal coordination (Coordination_Informal_t2), work alone on the project 
(Coordination_Work_Alone_t2) and coordination by non-profit organization 
(Coordination_by_Non_Profit_t2). We omit the last category in the regression. Finally, 
when testing Hypothesis 3, we control for the following categories that are derived from 
the third item; Admin is the owner of the firm (Admin/Owner_t2), Admin is an 
employee, who has duties other than working on the project 
(Admin/Employee&Not_Main_Duty_t2) and Admin is not an employee of the 
firm(Admin/Not_Employee_t2). We designate the last category to be the baseline 
category in the regression. 
We also introduce two sets of control variables, one of which controls for 
project characteristics and the other for firm specific characteristics in order to alleviate 
reverse causality and selection concerns30. Control variables related to projects’ 
                                                          
30 The control variables related to project characteristics that are used in the selection equation correspond 
to t1 while in the outcome equation we use the same set of controls measured at t2. There are only a few 
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characteristics that are relative to t2 include status of the project as declared by the 
respondents (Proj_Status_Active_t2, Proj_Status_Respondent_Not_Active_t2, 
Proj_Status_Not_Active_t2), the number of team members (Team_Size_t2), the degree of 
the project in the network of projects on sourceforge.net (measured by the average 
number of other projects participated by the project’s team members, Proj_Degree_t2), 
the number of messages sent to the project’s forums in the time period under analysis 
(Forum_Msgs_t2), whether the projects has activated or not advanced tools for code 
production (i.e. Concurrent Versions System, Coding_Tool_t2) or for communication 
(mailing lists and forums, Communication_Tool_t2). Many more dummy controls at 
project level have been identified that correspond to the development status of the 
project (Dev_Status_Mature/Stable_t2), the function of the software 
(Topic_Software_Development_t2), the language spoken by the team members 
(Language_English_t2), operating system the software was written for 
(Operating_System_Linux_t2, Operating_System_Group_Independent_t2)
31, 
programming language the software was written in 
(Programming_Language_C_C++_Sharp_t2), the intended audience of the project 
(Audience_Developers_t2) and the user interface type (Environment_Api_t2). In 
addition, we introduced controls in the selection equation that were only relative to t1 
such as; whether or not the project has declared any trove categories32 (No_Trove_t1), 
project’s registration time on Source Forge (Registered_Time_t1), performance of the 
project in the same period by using the number of files created in t1 (File_Number_t1) 
and total sizes of the files created in t1 (File_Size_t1). By including these controls, we 
aim to avoid a potential selection bias that might originate from firms’ decision to 
participate in a project or projects’ willingness to receive firms’ participation. Firm 
specific controls, which are relative to t2, include size, age, sector and region in which 
the firm is headquartered. Table 1 provides descriptive statistics. Tetrachoric 
correlations of our main variables of interest are presented in Table 2. There seems to be 
no problem regarding multicollinearity among these variables. Table 3a and Table 3b 
present the pairwise correlations among all the variables. 
                                                                                                                                                                          
exceptions that the variable was present for one of the two periods and, thus, was used in the 
corresponding equation (in selection equation if t1 and in outcome equation if t2). For instance, project’s 
status variables correspond to t2 and are not included in the selection equation. No_Trove_t2 was dropped 
due to collinearity. Thus, we only included No_Trove_t1 in the selection equation. 
31 OS Independent (written in an interpreted language). 
32 SourceForge net uses Trove system in order to classify projects.  The categories include topic, license, 
intended audience, programming language, intended audience, development status etc. 
http://sourceforge.net/apps/trac/sourceforge/wiki/Software%20Map%20and%20Trove 
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics 
Variables No. Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
      
1 File_Size_t3 267 5.208167 8.259461 0 23.25506 
2 File_Number_t3 267 .623222 1.134998 0 4.795791 
3 Direct_Involvement_with_Policy_t2 267 .3857678 .4876903 0 1 
4 Direct_Involvement_No_Policy_t2 267 .340824 .4748764 0 1 
5 Coordination_by_Firm_t2 1099 .1182894 .3230975 0 1 
6 Coordination_Formal_Leadership_t2 1099 .0500455 .2181381 0 1 
7 Coordination_Key_People_t2 1099 .2183803 .413335 0 1 
8 Coordination_Informal_t2 1099 .2829845 .4506541 0 1 
9 Coordination_Work_Alone_t2 1099 .3066424 .4613095 0 1 
10 Admin/Owner_t2 1099 .0746133 .262886 0 1 
11 Admin/Employee&Main_Duty_t2 1099 .0409463 .1982561 0 1 
12 Admin/Employee&Not_Main_Duty_t2 1099 .0709736 .2568977 0 1 
13 Coord(firm)*Admin/Emp&Main_t2 1099 .0209281 .1432089 0 1 
14 Firm_Size_t2 267 3.651685 2.389361 1 8 
15 Firm_Age_t2 267 30.31835 60.11486 4 790 
16 Proj_Status_Active_t2 1099 .055505 .2290676 0 1 
17 Proj_Status_Respondent_Not_Active_t2 1099 .0636943 .2443187 0 1 
18 Proj_Status_Not_Active_t2 1099 .3539581 .4784141 0 1 
19 #Messages_on_Forum_t2 1099 17.96087 180.6526 0 4156 
20 Project_Degree_t2 1099 2.271274 1.660326 1 23.66 
21 Dev_Status_Mature/Stable_t2 1099 .5641492 .4960936 0 1 
22 Reg_Time_Every_6_Months_t2 1099 9.028207 3.817576 1 15 
23 Team_Size_t2 1099 6.007279 9.715814 1 144 
24 Topic_Software_Development_t2 1099 .4131028 .4926152 0 1 
25 Prog_Language_C_C++_Sharp_t2 1099 .2565969 .4369538 0 1 
26 Audience_Developers_t2 1099 .7042766 .456575 0 1 
27 Language_English_t2 1099 .7015469 .4577877 0 1 
28 Operating_System_Indep. _t2 1099 .6797088 .4668008 0 1 
29 Operating_System_Linux_t2 1099 .1856233 .3889794 0 1 
30 Environment_Api_t2 1099 .1656051 .371895 0 1 
31 Communication_Tool_t2 1099 .9399454 .2376961 0 1 
32 Coding_Tool_t2 1099 .7825296 .412713 0 1 
 
Table 2: Correlation Matrix (Tetrachoric Correlations) 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
            
1 Direct_Involvement_with_Policy_t2 1.000           
2 Direct_Involvement_No_Policy_t2 -0.926 1.000          
3 Coordination_by_Firm_t2 0.351 -0.015 1.000         
4 Coordination_Formal_Leadership_t2 0.169 -0.155 -0.172 1.000        
5 Coordintion_Key_People_t2 0.014 -0.208 -0.292 0.246 1.000       
6 Coordination_Informal_t2 -0.222 0.112 -0.383 -0.456 0.119 1.000      
7 Coordination_Work_Alone_t2 -0.201 0.164 -0.203 0.047 -0.442 -0.479 1.000     
8 Admin/Owner_of_Firm_t2 0.194 -0.062 0.144 0.188 -0.014 0.151 -0.079 1.000    
9 Admin/Employee&Main_Duty_t2 0.032 -0.093 0.085 0.098 -0.008 -0.549 0.005 -0.511 1.000   
10 Admin/Employee&Not_Main_Duty_t2 -0.058 0.067 -0.082 0.002 -0.056 0.096 0.236 -0.389 -0.514 1.000  
11 Coord(firm)*Admin/Emp&Main_t2 0.087 -0.005 0.571 -0.442 -0.162 -0.409 -0.084 -0.408 0.735 -0.406 1.000 
 
4.3.3 Methodology 
Heckman’s two-step procedure, which combines a first stage probit and a 
second stage OLS model, is used in order to avoid a potential sample selection bias 
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(Heckman, 1979). While the first step corresponds to the estimation of the probit 
equation by MLE for the sample selection and to the computation of the inverse Mills 
ratio (Heckman’s lambda), the second step corresponds to the estimation of outcome 
equation on the selected sample by OLS including lambda as an additional regressor. 
The procedure is also known as ‘Heckit model’ and it gives consistent estimators. 
In our model, the selection equation includes project characteristics at t1 that 
may have a critical role in firms’ decision to participate actively in the project.33 In the 
outcome equation we aim to explore the effect of our main variables of interest, which 
are relative to t2, on project’s performance measured by number of files created and 
total sizes of the files created in t3. We control for firm level characteristics as well as 
project level characteristics in both equations. All the control variables in the outcome 
equation are relative to t2. However, we used the same control variables in the selection 
equation measured in t1 to be consistent.  
We use the licensing scheme of the software project as the exclusion restriction 
in the selection equation. Firms may choose the project that they are going to participate 
based on the licensing terms of the project. Firms, often, try to bundle the open source 
software with complementary proprietary software from which they make money. 
Licensing terms of the OSS project and its compatibility with the licensing terms of the 
complementary proprietary product is an important reason why a firm would or would 
not want to make investment in an OSS project. The licensing term, however, will not 
have an effect on the amount of code produced. Most people contribute to open source 
projects with features and capabilities because they want to use the resulting software 
themselves (Goldman and Gabriel, 2005). Hence, individual users’ initial purpose of 
contribution is not related to their aims of redistributing the software. However, the 
main difference among various open source software licenses originates from the 
conditions of redistribution and not from the terms of use. The individual users, who are 
interested in using the software and not in redistributing it, will continue contributing to 
the project no matter what the licensing term under which the initial code has been 
released. Thus, the licensing term of the initial code release will not affect how much 
code generated with the participation of the community. 
                                                          
33 The reduced sample, on which we work on in the selection equation, includes only those projects in 
which there is firm involvement. 
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Table 3a: Correlation Matrix (Pearson Correlations) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 
                 
1 File_Size_t3 1.00                
2 File_Number_t3 0.91 1.00               
3 Direct_Involvement_with_Policy_t2 0.17 0.20 1.00              
4 Direct_Involvement_No_Policy_t2 -0.14 -0.13 -0.57 1.00             
5 Coordination_by_Firm_t2 0.01 0.04 0.25 -0.00 1.00            
6 Coordintion_Formal_Leadership_t2 0.16 0.23 0.09 -0.07 -0.11 1.00           
7 Coordination_Key_People_t2 0.04 0.02 0.00 -0.13 -0.25 0.11 1.00          
8 Coordination_Informal_t2 -0.14 -0.15 -0.15 0.09 -0.33 -0.16 0.02 1.00         
9 Coordination_Work_Alone_t2 -0.08 -0.10 -0.11 0.09 -0.19 -0.05 -0.21 -0.16 1.00        
10 Admin/Owner _t2 0.03 0.02 0.17 -0.03 0.23 0.06 -0.01 0.01 -0.06 1.00       
11 Admin/Employee&Main_Duty_t2 0.23 0.29 0.03 -0.05 0.04 0.04 -0.03 -0.20 -0.03 -0.30 1.00      
12 Admin/Employee&Not_Main_Duty _t2 -0.13 -0.14 -0.02 0.06 0.03 -0.06 -0.04 -0.04 0.14 -0.43 -0.29 1.00     
13 Coord(byfirm)*Adm/Emp&Main_t2 0.21 0.25 0.06 0.01 0.33 -0.11 -0.08 -0.14 -0.07 -0.20 0.68 -0.20 1.00    
14 Firm_Size_t2 -0.09 -0.09 -0.14 -0.08 -0.21 -0.10 0.12 0.04 0.01 -0.49 0.16 0.13 0.08 1.00   
15 Firm_Age_t2 -0.09 -0.08 -0.11 -0.00 -0.11 -0.02 -0.03 0.12 -0.01 -0.20 0.06 -0.01 0.02 0.43 1.00  
16 Proj_Status_Active_t2 -0.12 -0.10 0.04 -0.04 0.05 -0.03 0.14 0.01 -0.03 0.04 0.04 -0.07 0.00 -0.05 -0.07 1.00 
17 Proj_Status_ Respondent_Not_Active_t2 -0.09 -0.08 0.03 -0.07 -0.04 -0.10 0.05 0.08 -0.05 -0.11 0.08 -0.04 0.02 0.12 -0.01 -0.10 
18 Proj_Status_Not_Active_t2 -0.25 -0.23 -0.01 0.03 -0.11 -0.13 -0.13 0.07 0.03 -0.09 -0.15 0.01 -0.10 0.07 0.12 -0.17 
19 # Messages_on_Forum 0.25 0.39 0.11 -0.04 0.05 0.11 0.02 -0.05 -0.05 -0.03 0.10 0.02 0.17 -0.05 -0.03 -0.05 
20 Project_Degree_t2 -0.06 -0.05 0.07 -0.11 -0.06 -0.03 -0.01 0.10 0.14 -0.04 -0.15 0.08 -0.13 -0.07 -0.08 0.01 
21 Dev_Status_Mature/Stable 0.16 0.13 0.18 -0.09 0.00 0.00 0.08 -0.06 0.01 0.08 0.12 -0.05 0.11 -0.02 -0.06 0.09 
22 Reg_Time_Every_6_Months_t2 -0.04 -0.06 -0.03 0.12 0.13 0.05 -0.17 0.10 -0.07 0.07 -0.15 0.04 0.02 -0.10 -0.02 -0.19 
23 Team_Size_t2 0.43 0.54 0.09 -0.11 -0.04 0.23 0.22 -0.10 -0.16 -0.12 0.29 -0.07 0.18 -0.01 -0.02 -0.03 
24 Topic_Software_Development_t2 -0.03 -0.03 -0.02 0.05 -0.04 -0.01 0.16 0.08 -0.04 0.04 -0.02 -0.00 0.10 0.01 -0.09 0.00 
25 Prog_Language_C_C++_Sharp_t2 -0.01 0.01 -0.02 -0.03 -0.06 0.02 0.04 -0.06 0.07 -0.01 0.05 -0.08 -0.08 0.05 -0.02 0.08 
26 Audience_Developers_t2 -0.04 -0.01 -0.04 0.03 0.04 -0.01 0.14 0.02 0.06 0.02 0.07 0.05 0.08 0.01 -0.10 -0.01 
27 Language_English_t2 0.06 0.10 0.11 -0.09 0.01 0.03 0.06 -0.09 -0.04 -0.05 0.11 -0.04 0.04 -0.04 -0.12 0.09 
28 Operating_System_Indep._t2 0.00 0.00 -0.03 -0.03 0.08 -0.04 0.01 -0.03 0.02 0.00 -0.05 0.08 0.02 -0.09 -0.02 0.10 
29 Operating_System_Linux_t2 -0.03 -0.05 0.03 0.03 0.01 0.11 -0.09 -0.16 0.07 0.01 -0.04 0.02 -0.08 0.03 0.02 -0.01 
30 Environment_Api_t2 0.08 0.05 0.07 -0.01 0.19 0.06 -0.02 -0.13 -0.11 0.15 0.03 -0.12 0.02 -0.16 -0.09 -0.03 
31 Communication_Tool_t2 0.02 0.04 -0.04 0.12 -0.08 0.10 -0.06 -0.03 0.06 0.04 -0.06 -0.01 -0.07 -0.05 -0.01 -0.23 
32 Coding_Tool_t2 -0.30 -0.27 -0.06 0.05 -0.04 -0.00 -0.08 -0.09 0.11 -0.04 -0.04 0.03 -0.12 0.08 0.10 -0.03 
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Table 3b: Correlation Matrix (Pearson Correlations) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 
                 
17 Proj_Status_ Respondent_Not_Active_t2 1.00                
18 Proj_Status_Not_Active_t2 -0.12 1.00               
19 # Messages_on_Forum -0.03 -0.06 1.00              
20 Project_Degree_t2 0.16 -0.09 -0.05 1.00             
21 Dev_Status_Mature/Stable 0.01 -0.15 0.09 -0.03 1.00            
22 Reg_Time_Every_6_Months_t2 0.03 -0.08 0.09 -0.12 -0.23 1.00           
23 Team_Size_t2 -0.06 -0.12 0.46 -0.08 0.17 -0.23 1.00          
24 Topic_Software_Development_t2 0.11 -0.05 -0.00 -0.09 -0.03 -0.08 -0.03 1.00         
25 Prog_Language_C_C++_Sharp_t2 -0.00 0.04 -0.06 0.16 -0.04 -0.39 0.05 -0.04 1.00        
26 Audience_Developers_t2 0.09 -0.10 0.03 0.09 0.10 -0.14 0.08 0.41 0.10 1.00       
27 Language_English_t2 -0.01 0.08 0.08 0.05 0.19 -0.44 0.11 -0.02 0.20 0.03 1.00      
28 Operating_System_Indep._t2 -0.07 -0.06 -0.04 0.00 0.06 -0.09 0.01 0.10 -0.14 0.06 0.17 1.00     
29 Operating_System_Linux_t2 -0.02 0.08 -0.02 0.06 0.06 -0.20 -0.05 -0.04 0.29 -0.07 0.11 -0.25 1.00    
30 Environment_Api_t2 0.03 -0.09 -0.04 -0.09 0.06 0.24 -0.01 -0.08 -0.10 -0.04 0.08 0.03 0.04 1.00   
31 Communication_Tool_t2 -0.04 0.06 0.04 -0.04 -0.06 0.11 0.09 -0.04 0.05 0.04 -0.01 -0.08 0.03 0.06 1.00  
32 Coding_Tool_t2 0.10 0.20 -0.12 0.07 -0.11 -0.17 -0.13 -0.09 0.17 0.01 0.07 0.00 0.15 -0.03 0.22 1.00 
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4.4 Findings 
The results of the Heckit model are presented in Table 4. It is possible to 
observe the direct effects of our main variables of interest- direct involvement with 
specific policy and coordination by firm- in the first model. In the second model, we 
introduce the interaction term between employee assignment as administrator and 
coordination by firm.  For each model, the results are presented under two columns one 
of which corresponds to the outcome equation and the other to the selection equation. 
We find that firm’s direct involvement in the project with specific policy has a positive 
effect on project’s performance as measured by number of files and sum of sizes of files 
generated during the project. On the other hand, the coefficient on the binary variable 
that represents coordination by firm is negative and significant when we use file size as 
dependent variable. These results are in support of Hypothesis 1 and Hypothesis 2. We 
observe that the direct effect of the binary variable that identifies the administrator of 
project as employee of the firm, whose main duty is to work on the project, do not have 
direct positive effect on project’s performance as measured by file size. However, we 
observe a significant positive effect of Employee/Main_Duty_t2 variable on performance 
as measured by number of files generated. 
When we introduce the interaction term between this variable and the 
coordination by firm variable in the second model, we observe a significant coefficient 
on the aforementioned interaction term.  This result suggests that the negative effect of 
coordination by firm on project’s performance is positively moderated if the firm 
assigns an employee, as the administrator of the project, to work full time on it. Results 
of the second model highlight the positive effect of presence of a policy to work on the 
OSS projects. The coefficient on direct involvement (with specific policy) variable 
maintains its positive and significant effect also after having introduced the interaction 
term. One may infer that even if the firm is directly involved in the project, without a 
specific policy on OSS, it will not contribute much to the performance of the project. 
Looking at different management methods of projects, it is possible to observe that 
informal coordination has a negative significant effect on project’s performance.  
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Table 4: Results of the Heckman Model 
 
 Model I Model II Model I Model II 
 (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) 
Variables File_Size_t
3 
Selectio
n 
File_Size_t
3 
Selection File_No_t
3 
Selectio
n 
File_No_t
3 
Selectio
n 
         
Firm involvement in the project         
         
H1  Direct_Involvement_with_Policy_t2 2.271*  2.246*  0.507***  0.507***  
 (1.168)  (1.176)  (0.143)  (0.149)  
      Direct_Involvement_No_Policy_t2 -0.064  -0.104  0.163  0.165  
 (1.180)  (1.181)  (0.129)  (0.130)  
Coordination style         
         
H2  By_Firm_t2 -2.002*  -3.323**  -0.210  -0.371**  
 (1.128)  (1.338)  (0.141)  (0.155)  
       Formal_Leadership_t2 1.279  1.893  0.484**  0.603**  
 (1.704)  (1.766)  (0.229)  (0.258)  
       Key_People_Through_Experience_t2 -0.961  -1.257  -0.277**  -0.316***  
 (1.013)  (1.022)  (0.114)  (0.114)  
       Informal_Coordination_t2 -2.447*  -2.998**  -0.222  -0.291*  
 (1.372)  (1.418)  (0.154)  (0.157)  
       Work_Alone_t2 -1.383  -1.817  -0.156  -0.223  
 (1.303)  (1.287)  (0.154)  (0.155)  
Admin involvement in the firm         
         
       Admin/Employee&Main_Duty_t2 1.516  -1.352  0.388**  0.030  
 (1.436)  (1.723)  (0.176)  (0.210)  
       Admin/Employee&Not_Main_Duty_t2 -2.010*  -1.562  -0.140  -0.075  
 (1.166)  (1.174)  (0.130)  (0.147)  
       Admin/Owner_t2 -0.216  0.297  0.142  0.206  
 (1.273)  (1.260)  (0.155)  (0.159)  
Interaction term         
         
H3  Admin/Employee&Main_Duty_t2 * 
       Coord_By_Firm_t2 
  5.677** 
(2.388) 
   0.739** 
(0.365) 
 
         
Controls for firm-level characteristics         
         
       Firm_Size_t2 -0.106  -0.110  0.002  0.001  
 (0.204)  (0.203)  (0.026)  (0.030)  
       Firm_Age_t2 -0.007  -0.006  -0.001  -0.001  
 (0.006)  (0.006)  (0.001)  (0.001)  
       Sector_Dummies_t2 Included  Included  Included  Included  
         
       Region_Dummies_t2 Included  Included  Included  Included  
         
Controls for project characteristics         
         
      Proj_Status_Active _t2 -3.812***  -3.651***  -0.345**  -0.329**  
 (1.057)  (1.015)  (0.139)  (0.141)  
      Proj_Status_Respondent_Not_Active_t2 -3.070**  -2.678*  -0.380*  -0.331  
 (1.536)  (1.564)  (0.209)  (0.236)  
      Proj_Status_Not_Active_t2 -3.885***  -4.041***  -0.326***  -0.334***  
 (0.971)  (0.979)  (0.121)  (0.121)  
      Communication_Tool_(t2/t1) 3.080* -0.225* 2.793 -0.231* 0.516** -0.206 0.477** -0.218* 
 (1.711) (0.135) (1.742) (0.135) (0.220) (0.126) (0.223) (0.128) 
      Coding_Tool_(t2/t1) -3.064*** -
0.284**
* 
-2.970** -
0.284**
* 
-0.174 -0.225** -0.159 -0.222** 
 (1.187) (0.085) (1.178) (0.085) (0.173) (0.088) (0.195) (0.089) 
      Team_Size_(t2/t1) 0.140* 0.011**
* 
0.138* 0.011**
* 
0.039*** 0.009**
* 
0.037*** 0.009**
* 
 (0.076) (0.002) (0.074) (0.002) (0.010) (0.003) (0.010) (0.002) 
      Dev_Status_Mature/Stable_(t2/t1) -0.650 0.154** -0.877 0.151** -0.192 0.130* -0.216* 0.124* 
 (0.963) (0.075) (0.950) (0.074) (0.127) (0.067) (0.131) (0.066) 
      Topic_Software_Development_(t2/t1) -1.390 0.213**
* 
-1.844* 0.212**
* 
-0.205 0.218**
* 
-0.261* 0.220**
* 
 (1.028) (0.080) (1.058) (0.080) (0.141) (0.079) (0.144) (0.079) 
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      Language_English_(t2/t1) -0.519 0.043 -0.450 0.043 0.075 0.012 0.069 (0.098) 
 (1.269) (0.082) (1.248) (0.082) (0.170) (0.087) (0.168) 0.008 
      Operating_System_Linux_(t2/t1) -0.620 0.045 -0.690 0.042 -0.206 -0.009 -0.223 -0.023 
 (1.406) (0.110) (1.385) (0.110) (0.177) (0.134) (0.178) (0.166) 
      Operating_System_Group_Indep. _(t2/t1) -0.172 0.106 -0.261 0.108 -0.038 0.044 -0.045 0.046 
 (1.146) (0.085) (1.127) (0.085) (0.164) (0.085) (0.162) (0.085) 
      
Programming_Language_C_C++_Sharp_(t2/t1
) 
-0.352 0.226** -0.194 0.215** -0.021 0.226** 0.010 0.217** 
 (1.103) (0.097) (1.089) (0.097) (0.142) (0.088) (0.142) (0.088) 
      Environment_Api_(t2/t1) 0.069 0.237** 0.406 0.230** -0.124 0.261**
* 
-0.066 0.247** 
 (1.208) (0.100) (1.226) (0.100) (0.153) (0.094) (0.153) (0.108) 
      Audience_Developers_(t2/t1) -2.982** 0.233** -2.803* 0.228** -0.383* 0.206** -0.371* 0.190* 
 (1.491) (0.096) (1.467) (0.096) (0.202) (0.093) (0.222) (0.098) 
      Registered_Time -0.430** 0.044**
* 
-0.480*** 0.044**
* 
-0.049** 0.036**
* 
-0.058** 0.036**
* 
 (0.176) (0.012) (0.176) (0.012) (0.025) (0.011) (0.027) (0.011) 
      File_Size_t1  0.026**
* 
 0.027**
* 
 0.274**
* 
 0.279**
* 
  (0.006)  (0.005)  (0.037)  (0.040) 
      No_Trove_t1  1.907**
* 
 1.920**
* 
 1.599**
* 
 1.560**
* 
  (0.452)  (0.440)  (0.328)  (0.354) 
Exclusion Restrictions         
         
      License_Apache_t1  -0.153  -0.131  -0.049  -0.032 
  (0.172)  (0.169)  (0.149)  (0.153) 
      License_Artistic_t1  -0.311  -0.327  -0.240  -0.247 
  (0.314)  (0.312)  (0.306)  (0.295) 
      License_BSD_t1  0.194*  0.194*  0.216**  0.209* 
  (0.118)  (0.114)  (0.106)  (0.115) 
      License_GPL_t1  -
0.318**
* 
 -
0.305**
* 
 -0.265**  -0.252** 
  (0.103)  (0.103)  (0.103)  (0.120) 
      License_LGPL_t1  0.084  0.105  0.132  0.164 
  (0.099)  (0.098)  (0.090)  (0.107) 
      License_MIT_t1  -0.066  -0.030  0.036  0.079 
  (0.241)  (0.235)  (0.255)  (0.260) 
      License_Other_t1  -0.008  0.002  0.018  0.035 
  (0.101)  (0.100)  (0.087)  (0.086) 
      License_Prop_Other_t1  0.348**  0.372**  0.328*  0.369* 
  (0.154)  (0.156)  (0.187)  (0.200) 
      License_Pub_Domain_t1  -0.025  -0.010  -0.133  -0.111 
  (0.299)  (0.295)  (0.346)  (0.373) 
Constant 23.053*** -
1.306**
* 
24.774*** -
1.311**
* 
2.313*** -
1.271**
* 
2.580*** -
1.263**
* 
 (4.301) (0.260) (4.395) (0.261) (0.760) (0.237) (0.981) (0.239) 
         
Observations 1,099 1,099 1,099 1,099 1,099 1,099 1,099 1,099 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
4.5 Discussion and Conclusion 
The findings of this study are three fold. First, being directly involved in a 
project with a specific policy on OSS has a positive effect on project’s performance. 
Second, coordination by firm has a negative effect on performance. Third, admin as an 
employee on main duty does not have a direct positive effect on performance. However, 
it positively moderates the aforementioned relationship.  
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These findings contribute to knowledge on benefits of co-creation of innovation 
between firms and communities of users and developers. The role of the firm in a 
community based project’s complex coordination mechanism and its effect on the 
success of the project is studied within the context of OSS. To our knowledge, there are 
no studies in the management literature that assesses the effect of having a specific 
policy, which describes how to work within a community, on the community-based 
project’s performance. We also focus on the role of the firm as the main authority in 
coordinating the community project and try to assess the effect of it in project’s success. 
As has been stated earlier, there are several means by which projects might be 
coordinated, such as formal leadership, informal coordination, key people through 
experience or work alone. Future research might investigate potential effects of these 
different coordination mechanisms on the benefits garnered from a collaborative mode 
of innovation. 
It would be also interesting to investigate how different participation strategies 
may affect the success of such collaborative innovation projects. Firms’ primary 
activities on projects vary largely. Some firms participate by writing code, by testing the 
early versions of the software or by reporting and fixing bugs; some others give logistic 
and financial support, take part in planning and designing; many others help in diffusing 
the product by marketing it. How each of these activities contributes to a successful 
innovation process through which both the firm and community may benefit is a key 
question to be resolved by future studies.  
Along this line, the paper can also directly inform managers on the strategies 
they should apply to assure long term sustainability of their external knowledge 
sourcing activities through communities. Managing the boundaries of collaborations is 
essential. Written rules and guidelines lead to fruitful joint development of software. In 
light of these findings, one may intuitively think that firm’s involvement in a 
community project seems to have a positive effect on the success of the project in the 
presence of formality and written rules. An explanation of such en effect could be that 
communities benefit from participation of firms due to their managerial capabilities. 
However, these capabilities should not exert too much control over so that it does not 
deter participation by volunteer developers. A balance should be struck between the 
community of developers and the professional firm for sustaining a fruitful 
collaboration that would bring benefits for both parties. The participative mode of 
managerial attitude of the administrator of the project, who is an employee of the firm, 
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might be helpful in achieving this balance. In this way, firm’s organization and 
management may actually fully develop and increase projects’ performance.  
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